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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which the process of globalization can explain the
observed widening in the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker. On the theoret-
ical front the model highlights why, when the labor market is subject to a holdup problem,
the opening up of trade will cause an increase in the dispersion of income across countries
similar to that observed in the data. The increase in dispersion in the model arises due
to the emergence of a discrepancy between the private and social returns to capital accu-
mulation that favors capital abundant countries. On the empirical front, we document the
relevance of the model by examining whether growth patterns, decomposition exercises and
specialization patterns support the model’s predictions. Overall we find that over 50% of
the recently observed increase in income dispersion across countries can be accounted for by
the mechanism exemplified by the model.
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1
Introduction
Over the last few decades, the volume of international trade has increased enormously, vastly
outpacing the growth in world GDP. This observation is often regarded as a defining element of
the process of globalization. Interestingly, over the same period, the distribution of income across
countries has changed considerably. For example, over the period 1960–1998, the distribution
of output–per–worker across countries hollowed out substantially as mass moved away from the
mean of the distribution towards two emerging modes (see Quah [1997], Jones [1997], Beaudry,
Collard and Green [2002] among others), thereby giving rise to (i) greater dispersion in income
across countries and (ii) the appearance of a bi–modal or Twin–Peaked distribution. This
simultaneity among the two phenomena is rather intriguing and it is natural to ask whether they
may be related. In particular, it is relevant to ask whether the different growth performances
underlying the change in the world distribution may be the result of an unequal distribution of
the gains associated with globalization.
In this paper, we explore whether basic trade theory may offer an empirically relevant explana-
tion to the observed change in the cross–country distribution of income. The main claim of the
paper is that a dynamic version of the Hecksher–Ohlin model of trade, once extended to allow
for an imperfection in the labor market, provides a simple explanation for why the opening up
of trade may be associated with increased dispersion in income across countries and the pos-
sible emergence of bi–modality. Moreover, and especially important, we show that the central
mechanism driving the result receives considerable support in the data. Although the model
is standard on many fronts, it departs from much of the literature by introducing a hold–up
problem in the labor market which allows workers to extract rents from firms with high capital
intensity.
The benchmark model we develop is one with a final good and two intermediate goods. The
process of globalization is modelled as the opening up of trade in intermediate goods. Com-
parative advantage in the model arises from differences in capital abundance driven by cross–
country differences in savings rates and rates of population growth. We contrast the behavior
of the model between the case with and without the presence of a holdup problem in the labor
market. In the absence of any labor market imperfections, we show why the opening up of trade
is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the cross–country distribution of income. However,
once the possibility of rent extraction in the labor market is allowed, we show that the opening
up of trade in intermediate goods will generate increased dispersion in incomes across countries
and can generate the emergence of a bi–modal distribution. One of the key elements of the
model is the interaction between the location of rent paying firms and the process of capital
accumulation. In particular, in our model, the main determinant of whether a country gains
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disproportionately from the opening up of trade in our model depends on its tendency to be
capital abundant. For example, a country with a high saving rate and a low rate of labor force
growth will tend to be capital abundant and will therefore tend to specialize in the production of
high-productivity high-capital-intensive goods during the process of globalization. This aspect
of the model leads to the main implication that, during the process of globalization, one should
witness the emergence of an abnormally strong link between a country’s growth rate and its
tendency to favor capital deepening. As we shall show, this and other predictions of the model
find considerable support in the data.
It is immediately worth emphasizing that the mechanism driving increased dispersion in our
model is distinct from the one implied in Ventura [1997]. In a model such as Ventura’s, global-
ization will affect the distribution of income across countries mainly by changing the distribution
of capital–output ratios. In particular, countries with low discount factors take advantage of
the absence of decreasing returns to capital to increase their savings rate and thereby their
capital–output ratios. In contrast, in our model, globalization increases the social returns to
being capital abundant, thereby causing increased dispersion even in the absence of any change
in capital–output ratios across countries. In other words, the differences between these two
approaches for explaining an increase in dispersion reduces to the distinction between a change
in the returns to capital accumulation versus a change in the distribution of capital–output
ratios across countries. Since such mechanisms are fundamentally different but possibly comple-
mentary, in the empirical section of the paper we will evaluate the relative importance of each
mechanism.
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. In section 1, we review a set of observations
related to changes in the world distribution over the period 1960–98 (these draw on observa-
tions documented in Beaudry et al. [2002], hereafter BCG) and we present a simple conceptual
framework for analyzing these observations. In section 2, we present the benchmark model.
Section 3 analyses the main implications of the model, with emphasis on its predictions in terms
of distribution of output–per–worker. In Section 4, we examine the main empirical implications
of the model. Since many of the assumption in the benchmark model are rather extreme, in the
appendix we discuss generalizations. Finally, the last section offers concluding remarks.
1 Changes in the Distribution of Output–per–Worker
In this section, we first review the salient changes in the cross–country distribution of the output–
per–worker that occurred over the period 1960–1998.1 Then we present a simple framework
1Many of the observations discussed in this section can also be found in other work such as Quah [1993] Jones
[1997], and Beaudry et al. [2002].
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which helps clarify the approach and that we will adopt to analyze this phenomenon.
1.1 Empirical Evidence
The main changes in the cross–country distribution of (log) output per worker are summarized in
Figure 1. The figure reports the distribution of (log) output–per–worker for the three years 1960,
1978 and 1998. The data are taken from the World Penn tables 6.0.2 We choose to highlight the
change in distribution for the set of non–sub–Saharan African countries to emphasize changes
which are not simply the results of the well–known poor growth performance of the sub–Saharan
Africa countries.3
The plotted distributions are kernel density estimates.4 Each of the three distributions is ex-
pressed as deviations from the US (log) level of output–per–worker in the corresponding year in
order to emphasize changes in the shape of the distribution. However, it should be noted that
the actual distribution shifted substantially to the right from 1960 to 1998. The average output–
per–worker increased by 134% between 1960 and 1998 for the 75 countries we consider, implying
an average annualized rate of growth of 2.27%. As can be seen from the figure, the shape of
Figure 1: Cross-Country (log–)Income Distribution: 1960–1998
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the distribution changed considerably from 1960 to 1998. In 1960, it was clearly uni–modal
2See Appendix C for the list of countries.
3To see the corresponding changes in the distribution that include the sub–Saharan countries, see Beaudry et
al. [2002].
4The density estimates are computed using the Rosenblatt–Parzen kernel density estimator. We used a
Gaussian kernel, with an optimal bandwidth parameter chosen as h = 1.0592σN−1/5 where σ is the standard
deviation of the data and N is the number of observations.
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and close to a normal distribution. In contrast, by 1998, the distribution appears somewhat bi–
modal. This observation corresponds to what Quah [1993] and Jones [1997] call the twin–peaks
phenomenon.5
Another important element to note in Figure 1 is the differential movement in the distribution
over the period 1960–78 versus 1978–98. Over the first sub–period, 1960 to 1978, the distribution
was actually shifting slightly to the right, suggesting that most countries were slowly catching
up with the US. This movement is totally in line with the convergence phenomenon predicted
by standard neoclassical growth theory. However, over the period 1978 to 1998, this process
entirely reversed itself as the distribution widened considerably and the density in the middle of
the distribution decreased substantially. In effect, it is in this second period (1978–98) that the
twin–peaks phenomenon emerged.
In order to get a better sense of the timing of the change in dispersion in output–per–worker
across countries, Figure 2 reports time series plots for three percentile differences: the 30–70
differences, the 25–75 difference and the 20–80 differences.6 We begin by focusing on these
percentile differences since Figure 1 indicates that the widening in the distribution for the
period 1978-98 is not governed by movements in the tails of the distribution but more akin to
movements in the interquartile range. Throughout the paper we will often refer to a widening
of a distribution when there are increases around the inter-quartile range even if there is no
widening in the tails.
As can be seen from the figure, these three percentile differences were rather stable through
most of the sixties and up to the end of the 1970s. Then, starting somewhere around 1978, the
dispersion — as measured by these percentile differences — started increasing substantially. In
particular, the interquartile range increased by about 40% over the period, after being quite
stable up to 1978. Table 1 reports the numerical values of a large set of percentile differences
in order to further emphasize that the increased dispersion observed over the period 1960–
98 arose almost entirely within the period 1978–98. For instance, let us again consider the
three percentile differences, 20–80, 25–75 and 30–70. From 1960 to 1978, these three percentile
differences decreased illustrating a convergence phenomenon across countries. Also note that
these changes are of about -0.1 for the first two differences and -0.02 for the last. The pattern
changed dramatically during 1978–98, as the differences increased over the period for all three
percentiles. Not only did this undo the changes over the previous period, it actually generated
increased dispersion for the two periods combined.
5Kremer, Onatski and Stock [2001] question the appropriateness of referring to this distribution a being twin
peak.
6The percentile differences are directly calculated from the data and not from the kernel estimates of the
density.
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Figure 2: Percentile differences
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Table 1: Changes in inter–quantile ranges: Output–per–worker (All countries)
Ranges Changes
1960 1978 1998 60–78 78–98 60–98
10-90 2.270 2.067 1.905 -0.203 -0.162 -0.365
15-85 1.762 1.396 1.840 -0.366 0.444 0.078
20-80 1.386 1.278 1.593 -0.108 0.314 0.207
25-75 1.057 0.947 1.322 -0.110 0.376 0.265
30-70 0.870 0.851 1.067 -0.019 0.216 0.197
35-65 0.604 0.597 0.820 -0.008 0.224 0.216
40-60 0.338 0.384 0.486 0.046 0.103 0.148
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In Table 2, we report the same set of percentile differences but we now split the sample into two
sub–groups. The two sub-groups are differentiated according to their ratio of international trade
(sum of imports and exports) to GDP, which is a common measure of openness. Specifically, the
Table 2: Changes in inter–quantile ranges: Output–per–worker (Split sample)
Ranges Changes
1960 1978 1998 60–78 78–98 60–98
(a) Openness<median
10-90 2.220 2.395 2.010 0.175 -0.385 -0.210
15-85 2.069 2.003 1.737 -0.066 -0.267 -0.333
20-80 1.579 1.629 1.348 0.050 -0.281 -0.231
25-75 1.094 0.997 1.029 -0.097 0.031 -0.066
30-70 0.766 0.712 0.724 -0.054 0.013 -0.041
35-65 0.480 0.479 0.536 -0.000 0.057 0.057
40-60 0.372 0.271 0.372 -0.101 0.101 0.000
(b) Openness>median
10-90 1.785 1.528 2.000 -0.257 0.472 0.215
15-85 1.409 1.336 1.830 -0.073 0.494 0.422
20-80 1.225 1.120 1.570 -0.105 0.450 0.345
25-75 1.084 0.924 1.127 -0.161 0.203 0.042
30-70 0.738 0.741 1.003 0.004 0.262 0.266
35-65 0.548 0.542 0.823 -0.007 0.282 0.275
40-60 0.305 0.418 0.636 0.113 0.218 0.331
first sample corresponds to the set of countries with a below median level of trade–to–gdp ratio
in the period 1960-78.7 The movement in percentile differences for this sample is given in Panel
(a) of the table, while Panel (b) reports the changes in percentile differences for the sample with
an above median trade–to–gdp ratio. The main elements we want to emphasize in Table 2 is
that the increased dispersion observed over the period 1978–98 in the whole sample appears to
be a characteristic of the more open economies but not of the less open economies. In fact, for
the more open economies, we see that all the percentile differences increased quite substantially
over the period 1978–98. For instance, the 25–75 percentile difference increased by 0.203 over
this period in the more open economies, but remained almost steady (0.031) in the less open
economies. This phenomenon is even more pronounced for the 20–80 percentile difference, as
it changed by 0.450 over this period in more open economies, while the less open economies
continued to experience a decrease in this difference. In contrast, over the period 1960-78, the
percentile differences in both groups moved similarly and tended to be quite stable. Last, let us
note that the average growth in these two subs–groups was very similar. Indeed, the more open
economies experienced an average annualized rate of growth of 3.22% per year over the period
7The results are almost identical if we divide the sample using the average trade–to–gdp ratio over the entire
period as opposed to using the 1960–78 period.
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1960–1978 and 1.32% for the period 1978–1998. The corresponding average annualized rate of
growth in the less open economies are respectively 3.31% and 1.37%.
The above set of observations leads us to ask whether the observed change in the distribution
over the period 1978–98 versus the period 1960–78 could be related to an increase in new trade
opportunities available to open countries starting in the seventies which subsequently lead to an
explosion in the volume of world trade.8 Before moving to the theoretical model, it is helpful to
outline a general framework for thinking about how globalization can affect the determination
of income and thereby its distribution. In particular, this framework allows to highlight the
approach we will adopt in the remaining sections of the paper.
1.2 A Simple Framework
When considering how the process of globalization may affect the cross–country distribution of
income, it is useful to breakdown the effects into two distinct channels, as illustrated in the next
diagram.
ψ - ν - y
R	
Globalization
ht(ψ) gt(ν)
On the one hand, let there be a set of exogenous country–specific driving forces, denoted by ψ,
which affects a country’s accumulation patterns in terms of investment rate and capital intensity,
which we summarize by ν. These exogenous driving forces, ψ, may be preferences, policies and
possibly demographics. Let the mapping between ψ and ν be represented by the function ht(·).
Given accumulation patterns, then the agents in the economy decide how best to use their
resources to determine output–per–worker, denoted by y.9 We will denote this second mapping
from accumulation patterns to output–per–worker by the function gt(·). We have indexed the
two mappings by time to highlight that they may change over time. In fact, as a framework,
we want to consider the process of globalization as potentially changing both the form of the
mapping from ψ to ν and the form of the mapping from ν to y.
8From 1960 to the early 1970s (1972), world trade (as measured as the ratio of trade-to-GDP) grew, on average,
by 0.19 points per year. The growth in world trade then started to accelerate as the average growth was 0.69
points per year between 1972 and 1998, with the growth rate between 1986 and 1998 being even faster at a
level of 0.90 points per year. In total, the degree of world openness as measured by the increase in the ratio of
trade-to-GDP grew from 23.72% in 1960 to 44.08% in 1998.
9Note that in this framework, globalization is only allowed to have a level effect of y. Accordingly, throughout
this paper we will explore a mechanism that only has a level effect on y but no growth effect.
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In order to understand the relationship between changes in the functions ht(·) and gt(·) and the
changes in the distribution of y, it is helpful to make use of the standard change of variable
formula to derive the pdf of yt, denoted µ
y
t (.). In this case, the pdf of y is a function of the
distribution of ψ, denoted µψ
t
(.), and the functions ht(·), gt(·). This relationship is given below,
where we evaluate the relationship at the median value of y to allow the clearest expression:
µyt (y
m) =
µψ
t
[ψm]
|gt′(ht(ψm))ht
′(ψm)|
(1)
where ψm is the median value of ψ. The important aspect to note from the above expression
is how the density of y relates to the slopes of the functions ht(·) and gt(·). Indeed, if the
distribution of ψ does not change over time, then the mass near the middle of the distribution
of y will decrease if either the slope of ht(·) or gt(·) increases. In other words, a potential
explanation to the observed hollowing out of the distribution of y is that either the slope of ht(·)
or gt(·) increased over time. The explanation we present will focus on an increase in the slope
of gt(·), that is, an increase in the sensitivity of y to capital accumulation.
In this paper, we will undertake three steps in order to evaluate whether the recent period of
globalization may have contributed to the observed changes in the cross–country distribution
of income. First, we will highlight the predictions of trade theory regarding how the opening
up of trade affects the mapping from a country’s accumulation patterns to the determination of
y, that is, we will illustrate how globalization may affect the function gt(·) and thereby affect
the distribution of y. Second we will evaluate empirically whether there has been a change
over time in the mapping between a country’s accumulation patterns and the determination of
output–per–worker, and we will examine whether such a change is consistent with that implied
by the theory. Third, we will examine how much of the change in the distribution of y over
the period 1978–98 may be accounted for by the change in the mapping gt(·), that is, we will
gauge the empirical relevance of this one channel in affecting the distribution of y. In addition,
we will compare the relative importance of the change in channel gt(·) versus ht(·) in explaining
the change in the distribution of y. This last step is particularly relevant since, as we will make
clear, in the type of model presented in Ventura [1997], globalization affects the determination
of y largely through its effects on ht(·). The main claim of this paper is that the change in the
mapping gt(·) is central to understand the recent changes in the distribution of y.
Since in the theory section, we want to highlight how the opening changes the mapping be-
tween accumulation patterns and output–per–worker, we will adopt an approach that treats
accumulation patterns as exogenous. To this end we will follow Solow [1956] and have capital
accumulation being governed by an exogenous country specific investment rate and a country
specific rate of labor force growth. This simplification will allow us to clearly focus on how
the opening of trade may affect the mapping gt(·). However, in the empirical section we will
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recognize that investment rates are not exogenous and we will use several different instrumental
variable strategies to evaluate whether the mapping gt(·) changed between the periods 1960–78
and 1978–98 in a manner consistent with the theory. The previous framework emphasizes spe-
cific links that may be relevant for understanding the observed change in the distribution of y.
However, it is worth noting that these links are not the only possible types of explanation. In
particular, it is quite natural to first think that a widening of a distribution may be primarily
driven by a change in the dependence of growth outcomes on initial condition. Indeed, if in
the first period (1960–78), growth was negatively related to a country’s initial level, while in
the second period the relationship was positive, then such a change of dependance on initial
conditions could easily explain the type of change observed in Figure 1. Although this is not the
channel that will be implied by our model, in the empirical section we will nonetheless evaluate
its merit relative to channel emphasized in the model.
2 The Model
In this section we present a model of the world economy consisting of a set of countries that
all produce the same final good, which can be either consumed or invested. The final good is
produced by means of two intermediate goods. Our objective with this model is to illustrate how
the opening of new trading opportunities affects the cross–country distribution of income. Most
of the analysis will be conducted in the absence of international financial markets, although in
the appendix we discuss how our results extend to the case with international capital flows.
An important element of our analysis will be to contrast how effects of trade differ depending
on whether the labor market functions in a frictionless manner or whether it is subject to an
imperfection that results in more capital intensive firms paying higher wages.
2.1 Individual Behaviors
Let the world be composed of a collection of N countries indexed by i, i = 0, 1, . . . , N , where
country 0 will be used as a reference country. In each country there is only one non–tradable final
good, Yi,t, which is produced using two tradable intermediate goods Z1,i,t and Z2,i,t according
to the following production function:
Yi,t = (Z1,i,t)
ϕ(Z2,i,t)
1−ϕ with ϕ ∈ (0, 1) (2)
Initially, there will be no trade in the intermediate goods, and then, due to what may be referred
to as the process of globalization, we will allow for trade in these goods where it is the production
of each intermediate goods net of exports which is used in the production of the final good. The
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objective in this section is to illustrate why such a process may change the determination of
output–per–worker and thereby change its dispersion.
The intermediate goods Z1 and Z2 can be produced domestically using physical capital, K,
and labor, L, according to constant returns–to–scale technologies represented by the production
functions:
Z1,i,t = Θ1K
α
1,i,t(ΩiΓtL1,i,t)
1−α with 0 6 α 6 1 (3)
Z2,i,t = Θ2K
β
2,i,t(ΩiΓtL2,i,t)
1−β with 0 6 α 6 β 6 1 (4)
where Θ1 and Θ2 are sector specific constants and where ΩiΓt is the country specific level of
labor augmenting knowledge at time t. Note that this formulation allows for a country specific
component in labor augmenting knowledge, Ωi, and allows for a common time varying component
Γt which is assumed to grow at the exogenous rate γ ≥ 0, that is, Γt+1 = (1 + γ)Γt, Γ0 > 0
given. The most important aspect that differentiates the two intermediate goods is that β > α,
which means that the intermediate good Z1 is less capital intensive than Z2.
We will assume that all producers of the intermediate goods and the final goods maximize profits
taking prices, wages and the rental rate on capital as given. This yields the following standard
input demand functions for capital and labor in each sector:
αP1,i,tZ1,i,t = qi,tK1,i,t
(1− α)P1,i,tZ1,i,t = W1,i,tL1,i,t
}
in sector 1
βP2,i,tZ2,i,t = qi,tK2,i,t
(1− β)P2,i,tZ2,i,t = W2,i,tL2,i,t
}
in sector 2
where the price of the final good is normalized to 1, and where P1,i,t, P2,i,t, qi,t, W1,i,t and W2,i,t
denote respectively, for economy i at time t, the price of the intermediate goods, the rental price
of capital and the wage rates in sector 1 and in sector 2. In the absence of trade in intermediate
goods, the prices P1 and P2 will adjust to equal domestic supply and demand for goods Z1 and
Z2. In the presence of trade in intermediates, the prices P1 and P2 will be set on the international
market, and Z1, Z2 will represent the sum of imported plus domestically produced good.
In contrast to the market for goods which is assumed to behave in a Walrasian fashion, we
want to allow for the possibility of non–Walrasian wage determination. Thus, we will assume
that workers can extract rents from firms due to the quasi–fixed nature of capital; that is, we
introduce the possibility of a hold–up problem between a firm and its workers. As is well known,
there are many ways to model such a possibility. One quite general implication of many such
models is that wages are higher in the more capital intensive firms.10 In order to capture this
10There is a large empirical literature which supports the notion that high capital intensive firms or high
capital intensive industries generally pay wage premia. For example, see Dickens and Katz [1987], Gibbons and
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idea in its simplest form, we will assume that wages in each sector are determined by a monopoly
union which takes labor demand as given and maximizes the following objective function:
(Wj,i,t −W
R
j,i,t)L
θ
j,i,t with 1 6 θ, j = 1, 2
where WR
j,i,t
is the reservation value of time for workers in sector j in economy i at period t.
Furthermore, we will assume that labor is supplied inelastically and hence the flow value of
being unemployed is zero. In this case, it is easy to verify that the unique equilibrium wage
setting outcome corresponds to (i) wage equating demand and supply for jobs associated with
producing the good Z1 (i.e., in the less capital intensive sector there is no rent extraction), and
(ii) wages for jobs associated with producing Z2 are set as a markup of x% over jobs in sector
1.11 This implies the following relationship between wages in the two sectors.
W2,i,t =
θ
θ − β
W1,i,t = (1 + x)W1,i,t (5)
Note that as θ tends to infinity, the wage premium in sector 2 — denoted by x — tends to zero
and hence wages are determined in a fully competitive manner. In what follows, we will want to
contrast how the process of globalization affects the cross-country distribution of income when
x equals zero versus when x > 0.
In order to complete the description of this economy, it is necessary to specify the dynamics of
labor and physical capital. Following traditional growth theory (ex: Solow [1956] and Mankiw,
Romer and Weil [1992]), we will assume that labor is supplied inelastically and grows at the
exogenous rate ni > 0 such that
Li,t+1 = (1 + ni)Li,t, Li,0 given. (6)
And we also assume that investment is determined by an exogenous savings rate si ∈ (0, 1) such
that the law of motion of capital is given by
Ki,t+1 = siYi,t + (1− δ)Ki,t, Ki,0 > 0 given (7)
Note that in this formulation, we are assuming away any international capital flows. In the
appendix we discuss how the relaxation of this assumption affects our results.
Katz [1992], Krueger and Summers [1988] for evidence in support of the notion that employment in high capital
intensive industries is associated with a wage premia. The more recent literature using matched worker–firm data
also finds that wage premia are generally associated with high capital intensive firms (see e.g. Abowd, Kramarz
and Margolis [1999] and Arai [2003]).
11If the flow value of being unemployed was sufficiently high, then the presence of monopoly unions would
generate equilibrium unemployment. We are ruling out this case by assumption.
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2.2 Equilibrium
We are interested in comparing two equilibrium outcomes for this set of economies: the outcome
in the absence of trade in Z1 and Z2, and the outcome in its presence.
In either case, a world equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices P = {Wj,i,t, qi,t, Pj,i,t; j =
1, 2; i = 1, . . . , N}∞
t=0, and a set of allocationsQ = {Yi,t,Kj,i,t, Lj,i,t, Zj,i,t; j = 1, 2; i = 1, . . . , N}
∞
t=0
such that,
1. Given the sequence of prices P, Q solves the firms’ problem;
2. Capital accumulates according to equation (7);
3. Given a sequence of allocations, Q, P clears the markets in the sense
Li,t = L1,i,t + L2,i,t
Ki,t = K1,i,t +K2,i,t
Yi,t = (Z1,i,t)
ϕ(Z2,i,t)
1−ϕ
4. International markets clear in the sense that
– In the absence of trade (autarky):
Z1,i,t = Θ1K
α
1,i,t(ΩiΓtL1,i,t)
1−α and Z2,i,t = Θ2K
β
2,i,t(ΩiΓtL1,i,t)
1−β
– If there is free trade, Pj,i,t, j = 1, 2 is independent of i (Pj,i,t = Pj,t) and trade is
balanced in each economy:
P1,t(Z1,i,t −Θ1K
α
1,i,t(ΩiΓtL1,i,t)
1−α) + P2,t(Z2,i,t −Θ2K
β
2,i,t(ΩiΓtL1,i,t)
1−β) = 0
In the above model, countries are allowed to differ along two dimensions: (i) they can have
different levels of labor augmenting knowledge Ωi, and (ii) they can have different propensities
to favor capital deepening as given by the index νi =
si
(1+n)(1+γ)−(1−δ) . Note that the index νi
corresponds to a countries steady state capital–output ratio and therefore a country with a high
value of ν will be more capital abundant in the steady state. Since we want to highlight how
globalization will change the role played by the distribution of νi in shaping the distribution
of output–per–worker, in what follows, notation will be considerably reduced by temporarily
abstracting from difference across countries in labor augmenting knowledge (i.e., we will tem-
porarily set Ωi = 1). An attractive feature of this simplification is that it will allow us to
focus exclusively on the role of ν in affecting cross–country differences in output–per–worker.
In what follows, we will denote per–worker variables by lowercase letters, for example y and k
for output–per–worker and capital–per–worker. Finally we will denote the probability density
function of νi by µ
ν(·).
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3 From Autarky to Free Trade in Intermediate Goods
This section examines how moving from an autarkic equilibrium to a free trade equilibrium
in intermediate goods affects the cross-country distribution of output–per–worker. We start
by assuming that the world economy is composed of N+1 closed economies that all evolve
in autarky and show that in such a case each economy behaves as the standard Solow [1956]
growth model with Cobb–Douglas technology and therefore the cross-country distribution of
output reflects the shape of the distribution of ν. In particular, we show that if the distribution
of ν — the propensity to favor capital deepening — is uni–modal, then so is the distribution of
output–per–worker (and also its logarithm). Furthermore, imperfections in the labor market, as
modeled by allowing x > 0, do not affect the cross–country distribution of income in the autarkic
equilibrium. We then open the economies and show how free trade affects the distribution of
income. In the absence of imperfections in the labor market, we show why such a model is
incapable of explaining the changes in the cross–country distribution of income documented in
Section 1.1. In contrast, in the presence of a labor market imperfection which gives rise to a wage
premium in the capital intensive firms, we show that the model can explain both an increase
in the cross–country dispersion of output–per–worker and potentially cause the emergence of
bi–modality.
For each case — the autarkic and free trade equilibrium — we first examine the determination
of output taking a country’s capital–labor ratio as given. Then we study properties of the cross–
country distribution when physical capital is allowed to adjust to its steady state value. As it
can be expected, the resulting distributions will be affected by the distribution of ν. We should
immediately emphasize that, for clarity of presentation, we are initially assuming that countries
differ only in terms of their propensity to accumulate capital (ν). Obviously, this assumption is
at odds with the data since it is well known that differences in ν can only account for a fraction
of the cross–country differences in income levels. For this reason, we will reintroduce differences
in labor augmenting knowledge towards the end.
3.1 Autarky
In the absence of international trade in intermediate goods, the model we have presented takes a
very simple form. As stated in Proposition 1, aggregate output in the country can be represented
by a simple Cobb–Douglas production function.12
Proposition 1 In the absence of international trade, the relationship between output–per–worker
12The interested reader is referred the Appendix for proofs of the Propositions.
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and capital–per–worker is given by
yit = Υ(Γt)k
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
it
(8)
with Υ(Γt) ≡ Θ
ϕ
1Θ
1−ϕ
2
(αϕ)αϕ(β(1−ϕ))β(1−ϕ)
[αϕ+β(1−ϕ)]αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
((1−α)ϕ)(1−α)ϕ((1−ϕ) 1−β1+x )
(1−β)(1−ϕ)
[(1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x ]
ϕ(1−α)+(1−ϕ)(1−β)Γ
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
t
Two aspects are worth emphasizing about Proposition 1. First, to understand this proposition,
it is helpful to note that the amount of labor time being allocated by each intermediate good
firm between the production of type 1 versus type 2 type intermediate goods does not change as
the capital–labor ratio varies. In effect, as the capital–labor ratio increases the production of the
type 2 good increases, but because the relative price of Z2 in terms of Z1 good adjusts, this leaves
the ratio of marginal productivity of labor across the two activities unchanged. Therefore, as
the capital–labor ratio increases, a country does not become more specialized in the production
of the capital intensive good.
A second feature to note from Proposition 1 is that an increase in x— the labor market distortion
— leads to a decrease in Υ(Γt) and hence a decrease in output–per–worker. This arises due to
the fact that the labor market distortion causes a sub–optimal allocation of worker between the
two goods Z1 and Z2. However, it is worth noting that in the autarky equilibrium, the labor
market distortion x does not affect the return to capital accumulation and does not cause any
discrepancy between the social and private return to capital as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 In the autarky equilibrium, the private and social returns to capital are equalized
and are independent of the size the labor market distorsion, x.
We now turn to the determination of the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker when
we allow capital to adjust to its steady state. Using the capital accumulation equation (7) and
the aggregate production function given by Proposition 1, we find that along the steady state
growth path yit satisfies the following relationship:
yi = Υ(Γt)
1
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ) ν
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
i
(9)
For ease of comparison with empirical counterparts, it is helpful to consider the determination
of the logarithm of yi relative to a reference economy, y0t. To this end, let us define ŷi =
log(yit)−log(y0t) and ν̂i ≡ log(νi)−log(ν0) and note that ŷi satisfies the follow linear relationship:
ŷi =
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
)
ν̂i (10)
It is now straightforward to derive the steady state distribution of ŷi, which is given in the next
proposition.
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Proposition 3 In the absence of international trade, the steady state distribution of (log–) output–
per–worker relative to a reference economy (y0), is given by
µby(ŷ) =
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
µbν
(
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
ŷ
)
where µν(·) denotes the distribution of ν̂ ≡ log(ν)− log(ν0).
As can be seen in Proposition 3, the distribution of relative (log–) output–per–worker consists
simply of a re–scaling of the distribution of ν̂. A direct implication of this linearity in the
relationship between ν̂i and ŷi is that if the propensity to favor capital deepening, ν̂, is distributed
according to a uni–modal distribution, then the distribution of output–per–worker inherits this
uni–modality under autarky.
3.2 Free trade and the Static Determination of Output–Per–Worker
We now turn to examining the implications of opening up trade in intermediate goods for the
equilibrium distribution of output–per–worker. To derive these implications, we need to address
two distinct questions. First, we need to determine how a country’s aggregate level of output
changes when it can trade both type of goods (Z2 and Z1) in the world market at relative price
p. Second, we need to determine the world relative price p. Our approach is to focus on the first
question and adopt a convenient approximation for the second. In effect, we will assume that
world relative price,p, of Z2 in terms of Z1 under free trade is given by the autarky price of the
reference economy. Since in practice, our reference economy is the US economy, this assumption
corresponds to assuming that the US economy is not greatly influenced by the possibility of
international trade in the sense that US relative prices under autarky would be quite similar to
actual US prices. Since the fraction of output directed to international trade in the US over the
period examined is rather small, this appears to us as a reasonable benchmark. Nonetheless,
in the appendix we show how our results can be extended and our proposition rephrased when
this approximation does not hold.
In order to characterize the main properties of the economy, it is helpful to first make explicit
the conditions that would lead a country to full specialization in the production of either Z1 or
Z2 under free trade. This is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 For given international prices, there exists two levels of capital–per–worker denoted
by k(pt,Γt) and k(pt,Γt), such that when endowed with a capital–per–worker below k(pt,Γt), a
small open economy specializes in the production of good 1, while it specializes in the production
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of good 2 when its capital–per–worker lies above k(pt,Γt), with
k(pt,Γt) = Γt
(
pt
Θ2
Θ1
) 1
α−β
(
β
α
) β
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
) 1−β
α−β
k(pt,Γt) = Γt
(
pt
Θ2
Θ1
) 1
α−β
(
β
α
) α
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
) 1−α
α−β
The intuition for Lemma 1 is standard from Hecksher–Ohlin international trade theory: eco-
nomies specialize in the production of the good which is intensive in the factor they have in
abundance. Hence, when the economy is either poorly endowed in capital–per–worker due to
insufficient capital accumulation (kt < k(pt,Γt)), it specializes in the production of good 1.
Conversely, if it accumulates a sufficiently high level of capital per worker (kt > k(pt,Γt)), it
specializes in the production of good 2, which is capital intensive. Given this notation, we can
now present the relationship between a country’s capital–labor ratio and its level of production,
which we will refer to as the country’s effective production function.
Proposition 4 Under free trade a country’s level of output–per–worker is given by
yit =

Φpϕ−1
t
A1tk
α
it
Γ1−α
t
if kit 6 k(pt,Γt)
A(pt)kit +B(pt)Γt if k(pt,Γt) 6 kit 6 k(pt,Γt)
Φpϕ
t
A2tk
β
it
Γ1−β
t
if kit > k(pt,Γt)
where Φ = ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ and
A(pt) = Φp
ϕ−1
t
α(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β
1+x
(ptΘ2)
1−α
β−αΘ
1−β
α−β
1
(
β
α
)β(1−α)
β−α
(
1−β
(1+x)(1−α)
) (1−β)(1−α)
β−α
B(pt) = Φp
ϕ−1
t
(β−α)(1−α)
β(1−α)−α 1−β
1+x
(ptΘ2)
α
α−βΘ
β
β−α
1
(
β
α
) αβ
α−β
(
1−β
(1+x)(1−α)
)α(1−β)
α−β
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, where the production function is depicted under both
autarky and free trade. In the autarkic situation, the technology is strictly concave, as implied
by Proposition 1. When countries can trade in intermediate goods, the shape of the effective
production function depends on whether or not there is a labor market distortion. In particular,
in the case where x = 0, free trade leads to an unambiguous increase in production outcomes as
a function k. This reflects the standard gains from trade result in international trade theory. In
contrast, when x > 0, Figure 3 indicates that a country’s effective production function pivots
around the production outcome of the large economy, causing countries with capital–labor ratios
lower than that of the large reference economy to potentially lose from international trade. The
source of the potential loss comes from the fact that countries with low capital–labor ratios
shift their production mix away from the production of Z2 towards the production of Z1. Since
firms producing Z2 pay higher wages and thereby have higher labor productivity, this shift in
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Figure 3: Aggregate Production Function
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production mix can cause a fall in output. On the alternative side, countries with high capital–
labor ratio will fare particularly well under free trade since they specialize in the high–wage
high–labor productivity jobs.13
An important element to acknowledge is that, even when x > 0, free trade in intermediate
goods causes factor price equalization for all non–fully specialized countries. However, this does
not imply that the average wage will be equal across such countries. It only implies that the
sector specific wages (W1 and W2) and the rental price of capital are equalized. The average
wage will vary across country due to the different output compositions. Hence, when x > 0, an
increase in the capital–labor ratio does not only increase output–per–worker but also increases
average wages as more workers are paid a wage premium. Since this arises with the return
on capital being fixed, it implies that under free trade there emerges an externality associated
with capital accumulation that was not present under autarky. This property is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 If x > 0, then under free trade the social returns to capital are higher than the
private return for all countries that do not fully specialize. Moreover, the difference between the
private and social return to capital is increasing in x.
Having established how free trade affects a country’s production possibility set, we now investi-
gate the effect of free trade on the steady state distribution of output–per–worker.
3.3 Free Trade and the Steady State Distribution of Output–per–Worker
This section shows how the opening of trade in intermediates can lead to an increase in the cross–
country dispersion of output–per–worker and, in addition, potentially causes the emergence of
bi–modality. We again consider both the cases where x > 0 and where x = 0. Since, as can be
seen in Figure 3, the effective production function is not concave when x > 0, it is first necessary
to establish that the steady state level of output–per–worker is uniquely defined.
Proposition 6 Under free trade, regardless of the value of x, all economies possess a unique non–
trivial steady state.
Proposition 6 indicates that the mapping between ν̂i and ŷi will be well–behaved regardless of
the value of x. The next lemma presents this mapping.
13It is worth noting that that countries with very low capital–labor ratios are still likely to gain from free trade
even in the presence of a labor market imperfection since such countries produced only small quantities of Z2
initially and therefore gain by being able to import Z2 at a low price relative to their autarky price.
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Lemma 2 The relationship between the steady state level of relative output-per-worker in economy
i, ŷi, and the relative propensity for capital deepening, ν̂i is given by
ŷi =

log
(
(1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β
1+x
1−α
)
+ α1−α(ν̂i − ν̂) if ν̂i < ν̂
log(ρ)− log (1− (1− ρ) exp(ν̂i)) if ν̂ 6 ν̂i 6 ν̂
log
(
(1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β
1+x
1−β
1+x
)
+ β1−β (ν̂i − ν̂) if ν̂i > ν̂
where ν̂ = log
(
α
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
)
and ν̂ = log
(
β
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
)
and ρ =
(β−α)(ϕ(1−α)+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β
1+x
Endowed with lemma 2 and a distribution for the propensity to accumulate capital, ν̂, a direct
application of the change in variable formula allows for an analytical derivation of the distribution
of output–per–worker across countries, as given below.
Proposition 7 The steady state distribution of output–per–worker, relative to the reference econ-
omy, ŷ, is given by
µby(ŷ) =

1−α
α
µ
bν
(
1−α
α
(ŷ − ŷ)− log
(
α
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
))
if ŷ < ŷ
(1− ρ) exp(ŷ)
1− (1− ρ) exp(ŷ)
µ
bν
(
log
(
1− (1− ρ) exp(ŷ)
ρ
))
if ŷ 6 ŷ 6 ŷ
1−β
β
µ
bν
(
1−β
β
(ŷ − ŷ)− log
(
β
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
))
if ŷ > ŷ
where µ
bν(·) is the distribution of ν̂ = log(ν)− log(ν0), ρ ≡
(αϕ+β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β
1+x
,
ŷ = log
(
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ)1−β1+x
1− α
)
and ŷ = log
(
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ)1−β1+x
1−β
1+x
)
In principal, we can now compare how the distribution given in the previous proposition differs
from the one derived under free trade. However, such a comparison is not transparent. In order
to make progress on this issue, it is helpful to begin by focusing the analysis of the mapping
between ν̂ and ŷ and identify the first order effects. To this end, Proposition 8 highlights the
first order effects of free trade on the mapping between ŷi and ν̂i.
Proposition 8 If x > 0, the first order effect of free trade is to increase the sensitivity of ŷi =
log(yi) − log(y0) with respect to ν̂i = log(νi) − log(ν0). However, if x=0, free trade has no first
order effect on the mapping from ν̂i to ŷi.
In order to visualize the content of Proposition 8, Figure 4 illustrates how the mapping between
ŷi and ν̂i is affected by the opening of trade under both the scenario where x = 0 and the case
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where x > 0. As can be seen from the figure, in the case of autarky, the mapping between ŷi
and ν̂i is linear with a positive slope regardless of the value of x. In the case where x > 0,
the mapping becomes S–shaped, with a crossing occurring at the point ν̂i = 0. The important
aspect to note is that at this point, the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i (evaluated at ν̂i = 0) is strictly
greater under free trade relative to autarky. In effect, under autarky
∂ŷi
∂ν̂i
∣∣∣∣
bνi=0
=
∂ŷ
∂ν̂
=
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
,
while under free trade
∂ŷi
∂ν̂i
∣∣∣∣
bνi=0
=
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
) (1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ))(1− α− 1−β1+x)
(β − α)
(
(1− α)ϕ+ (1− ϕ)1−β1+x
) > αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
.
Hence, for countries that do not differ much in terms of ν relative to the reference economy,
there is an unambiguous first order effect due to the opening up of trade since it increases the
sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i. In contrast, for the case where x = 0, we can see that the passage to free
trade causes the mapping between ŷi and ν̂i to become convex with a tangency arising at the
point where ν̂ = 0. Hence, in this case, the passage to free trade has no first order effect on the
determination of ŷi since the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i is unchanged in the neighborhood of ν̂i = 0.
In order to get a sense of the extent to which the opening up of trade can increase the sensitive
of ŷi to ν̂i, which is given by the term
(1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
(β−α)((1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x )
, it is of interest to give illustrative
values to the parameters for α, β, ϕ and x. For example, in the case where14 α = 0.31, β = 0.4,
ϕ = 0.75 and x = 0.16, the effect of opening up trade in intermediate goods would be to double
the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i. Hence, we see that the theoretical effect implied by Proposition 8 can
easily be of a sizable magnitude.15
The economic mechanism which gives rise to these first order effects should now be quite clear.
In particular, under free trade, a country with a high value of ν̂ (i.e. a high propensity for
capital deepening) will gain relative to a country with a low value of ν̂ since the former will
shift its production mix towards the rent–paying high–labor–productivity activity Z2, while the
latter shifts in the opposite direction and reduces its employment in the rent–paying high–labor–
productivity activity. In contrast, in the case where x = 0, there is no preferable direction in
terms of production mix and therefore countries with positive versus negative values of ν̂ will
have, to a first approximation, similar outcomes. The one last element worth noting from Figure
14These parameters are chosen so that the share of capital in a closed economy is 1/3.
15The model also has implications for how the opening up of trade affects the distribution of measured total
factor productivity across countries. In particular, it is easy to show that if x > 0, then the opening up of
trade will increase the dispersion of measured total factor productivity across countries due to the fact that the
share of revenue received by capital does not capture the full impact of capital on output, and correspondingly
the non–appropriated impact of capital on output is reflected in measured TFP. In contrast, if x=0,, then the
opening up of trade should have no impact on measured TFP since the market return to capital appropriately
captures the marginal productivity of capital.
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Figure 4: Output–per–worker versus ν
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4 is that under free trade the slope of the relationship between ŷi and ν̂i near ν̂i = 0 is strictly
increasing in x.
Given the content of Proposition 8, it is straightforward to state the first order effects of free
trade on the distribution of ŷ, as given in following corollary.
Corollary 1 If the distribution of ν̂i is concentrated around zero, then the first order effect of free
trade on the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker is nil when x = 0. In contrast, it
leads to an increase in dispersion when x > 0.
The above corollary makes explicit the sense in which the process of globalization may offer an
explanation to the observed widening of the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker.
However, in addition to potentially explaining an increase in dispersion, it is of interest to
examine whether the current model could also explain a change in shape of the distribution in
the form of the emergence of bi–modality. The following Lemma is useful for exploring this
possibility.
Lemma 3 Consider two observable random variables, Y1 and Y2, which are both transformations
of a random variables ν, where the first transformation is linear and results in the variable
Y1 = αν, α > 0, while the second transformation is non–linear (continuous and differentiable)
and results in the variable Y2 = g(ν), g
′(·) > 0. If the distribution of Y1 is uni–modal, then a
necessary condition for the distribution of Y2 to be bi–modal is that g(·) not be a convex function.
This lemma can be directly used to evaluate whether free trade can cause the emergence of
bi–modality once one recognizes that the variable Y1 can be interpreted as ŷi under autarky,
while Y2 can be interpreted as ŷi under free trade. Hence, the necessary condition for free
trade to cause the emergence of bi–modality is that the mapping between ŷi and ν̂i be non–
convex. As we have seen in Figure 4, if x = 0, the mapping between ŷi and ν̂i is convex and
therefore the opening up of trade cannot explain the emergence of a bi–modal distribution. In
contrast, if x > 0, then the mapping between ŷi and ν̂i is not convex (it is S–shaped), and
hence the opening up of trade under the presence of labor market imperfections could cause the
emergence of bi–modality. This observation is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 If x=0, the opening of trade in intermediate goods cannot generate the emergence
of a bi–modality in the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker. Conversely, if x > 0
then the opening up of trade may cause the distribution to exhibit bi–modality.
Once again, we see that in the absence of labor market imperfections, the process of globalization
as modeled in this paper does not offer a very likely candidate for the observed changes in
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the world distribution of output–per–worker, as long as the attention is focused on the gt(·)
channel described in Section 1.2. However, once a labor market distortion in the form of a
wage premium in high–capital intensive jobs is introduced, then the model offers a potential
explanation. Obviously, Proposition 9 only indicates that the opening up of trade may cause
the emergence of bi–modality if x > 0; it does not say that it will cause bi–modality. Nonetheless,
we are content with this possibility result16 since (i) we know through simple examples that the
model can give rise to the emergence of bi–modality, (ii) we will explore empirically whether
the mechanism emphasized by this model can explain the observed change in shape of the
cross–country distribution of output–per–worker.
At this point it seems appropriate to contrast the above results to those that would be obtained
in a model with optimizing consumers as in Ventura [1997]. In Ventura [1997], each country
is characterized by infinity–lived optimizing consumer with a country specific discount factor.
In this case, the first order effect of opening up of trade is to eliminate decreasing returns to
capital but not to increase its average return. Therefore, countries with low discount factors
increase there savings rate and thereby experience high investment rates without encountering
diminishing returns, while countries with high discount factors reduce investment rates. The
resulting differences in investment rates lead to continually expanding differences in capital
output ratios across countries. This leads to greater dispersion in the capital–output ratios
and therefore to greater dispersion in output–per–worker. In other words, in Ventura’s model,
globalization affects the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker mainly by changing
the distribution of ν. In the framework of section 1.2, this would amount to a change in the
ht(·) function.
In contrast, in our model with x > 0 — even if the distribution of capital-output ratios is held
fixed — globalization increases the social returns to being capital abundant, thereby causing
increased dispersion even in the absence of any change in capital–output ratios across coun-
ties. Hence, globalization affects the distribution of output–per–worker through a change in the
sensitivity of output–per–worker with respect to ν.17
The differences between these mechanisms can be summarized by an increase in the dispersion
of ν (a change in ht(·) in Ventura’s model) as opposed to an increase in the returns to ν (a
change in gt(·) in our model). Each of this mechanism can be evaluated empirically, that is, the
quantitative relevance of these different mechanisms can be potentially evaluated by examining
16It is possible to derive the stronger result that free trade will cause the emergence of more than one mode in
the distribution of by if one assumes that the distribution of bν is continuous and that its support encompasses bν.
17In terms of the notation presented in Section 2.1, the central change in our model corresponds to a change
in the slope of the function gt(·), while in Ventura the effect on gt(·) is only of second order while the change on
ht(·) is of first order.
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whether much of the change in the cross–country distribution of income can be accounted for
by changes in the distribution of ν versus changes in the returns to ν. Accordingly, such an
exercise will be conducted in Section 4.
3.4 Reintroducing Differences in Labor Augmenting Knowledge
Up to now, we have been abstracting from country specific differences in productivity. In this
section we want to briefly discuss how our main results extend if we allow for country specific
differences in labor augmenting knowledge – as captured in our notation by Ωi. Recall that in
the absence of trade in intermediates, the mapping from ν̂i to ŷi is given by the following:
ŷi =
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
)
ν̂i (11)
In the case of free trade, the linear approximation for the mapping between ŷi and ν̂i is given by
the following relationship, where it is immediate to see that the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i is greater
under free trade if x > 0.
ŷi ≈
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
) (1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ))(1− α− 1−β1+x)
(β − α)
(
(1− α)ϕ+ (1− ϕ)1−β1+x
) ν̂i (12)
If we now introduce differences across countries in labor augmenting knowledge, then these two
mappings need to be modified to reflect the differential productivity term ω̂i = logΩi − log Ω0.
In the case of autarky, this implies that the determination of ŷi is given by:
ŷi =
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
)
ν̂i + ω̂i (13)
while in the case of free trade, the determination of ŷi is approximately given by:
ŷi ≈
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
) (1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ))(1− α− 1−β1+x)
(β − α)
(
(1− α)ϕ+ (1− ϕ)1−β1+x
) ν̂i + ω̂i (14)
Therefore, in the absence of any change in the distribution of ν̂i or ω̂i, the first order effect of
opening up of trade in intermediates will be to increase the dispersion of ŷi if ν̂i and ω̂i are
uncorrelated or positively correlated. Hence, if we allow for cross–country differences in Ωi,
our main results continue to hold quite generally. It is only in the case of a sufficiently strong
negative correlation between ν̂i and ω̂i — which a priori seems rather unlikely — where the
introduction of differences in Ωi limits the scope of application of our main results.
4 Empirical Evaluation
The model of the previous section illustrated how the opening up of trade can affect the cross–
country distribution of income when workers receive rents in capital intensive jobs. In this
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section we explore the empirical relevance of the model by examining four key implications.
First, the model implies that during a period of globalization we should observe an increase
in the social returns to capital accumulation, that is, ∂byi
∂bνi
should increase over a period of
globalization. To explore this prediction, we will estimate and compare the mapping between
ν̂i and ŷi in the period 1978–98 versus the period 1960–78 using different instrumental variable
approaches. Second, if the model is right, then it is among countries most likely affected by trade
where we should observe an increase in the returns to capital accumulation. We will explore this
implication by comparing the behavior of the sub–sample of more open countries relative to the
less open countries. Third, the model implies that the increase returns to capital should account
for much of the observed change in the cross–country distribution of income. This implication
will be examined by building a counter–factual distribution of output–per–worker in 1998 where
we undo the effects of any change in ∂byi
∂bνi
observed over the period 1978–98 versus 1960–78. If
changes in ∂byi
∂bνi
are central for understanding the observed change in cross–country distribution
of output–per–worker, then such a counterfactual should replicate rather well the observed 1978
distribution. Fourth, the model predicts that during the period of globalization, countries which
favor capital accumulation (i.e. countries with high values of νi) should experience stronger
employment growth in high capital intensive sectors. We examine this implication by comparing
the growth in manufacturing employment between between high and low νi countries.
4.1 Has There Been an Increase in the Social Return to Capital Accumula-
tion?
As highlighted by Proposition 8 and Equations (11) and (12), a central implication of our model
is that the first order effect of opening up trade is to increase the effect of ν̂i on the steady
state value of ŷi. To examine the empirical relevance of this idea, it is appropriate to consider
a partial adjustment model for ŷi, where ŷi converges at rate λt towards its steady state value.
In this case, the relationship between the growth in ŷi and ν̂i is approximately given by
ŷi,t+1 − ŷi,t = (λt − 1)ŷit + (1− λt)ηtν̂i,t (15)
where the model predicts that βt should be greater in a more globalized environment than
under a situation closer to autarky.18 In order to evaluate this prediction, we estimate Equation
(15) over separately over the period 1960–78 and the period 1978–98, and we examine whether
the results give support to the idea of an increase in the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i. Table 3 and
4 report results based on estimating Equation (15) by OLS and instrumental variables. The
data used in the regression are taken from the World Penn Tables 6.0, and the set of countries
used in estimation are the same as that underlying Figure 1. The value of ν̂it for each country
18Note that Equation (15) can be seen as simply a case of a growth regression with time–varying coefficients.
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is constructed as in Mankiw et al. [1992] by setting γ + δ at 5%, using the average value of
investment–output ratio over the relevant sub–period for si, and using the average growth of
the adult population over the relevant sub–period for ni. This variable, and all other variables,
are then expressed as deviation from the US. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, we report the
Table 3: Benchmark Regression
OLS IV1 IV1 IV2
60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cst. -0.004 -0.013 -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 0.000 -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
ŷ0 -0.013 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ν̂ 0.016 0.029 0.011 0.030 0.010 0.031 0.008 0.030
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Ĥ – – – – 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
R2 0.36 0.51 – – – – – –
R2fs – – 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.82 0.75
Fexcl – – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Q(Total) 12.859 [0.002] 9.665 [0.008] 13.467 [0.004] 16.768 [0.001]
Q(y0) 0.017 [0.898] 0.501 [0.479] 0.100 [0.752] 0.175 [0.676]
Q(ν) 9.999 [0.002] 7.371 [0.007] 7.019 [0.008] 11.871 [0.001]
Q(H) – – – – 0.167 [0.683] 0.218 [0.640]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. IV1: the variables used to instrument
bν are the average (c/y) over the sub–sample, and the average growth rate of population over the
15 first periods of the sub–sample. IV2: The instrument is the beginning of period investment–
to–output ratio. 75 observations. 68 observations when education is included. R2fs denotes the
R2 of the first stage regression. Fexcl denotes the p–value for the F test for excluded instruments.
OLS estimate of Equation (15) along with stability tests for the coefficients. As can be seen, the
OLS estimates suggest that the relationship between the growth of ŷi and ν̂i changed between
the two periods, while the dependence of growth on initial conditions is found to be stable. The
stability test, Q(ν̂) indicates that the coefficient on ν̂ changes significantly when comparing the
period 1960–78 versus 1978–98 (p–value=0.002)19, while Q(ŷ0) indicates that the coefficient on
ŷ0 (p–value=0.898) is stable.
20 The coefficient on ν̂ is estimated to be 0.016 over the period
1960–78, while its estimate almost doubles to the value of 0.029 for the period 1978–98.
Since ν̂i,t may be correlated with other factors affecting the growth in output–per–worker, in
the last columns of Table 3 and in Table 4, we report a set of instrumental variable estimates
19The test of the overall stability of all three coefficients (Q(Total)) is also clearly rejected.
20Note that all our stability tests are performed allowing for residuals to be correlated within countries over
the two samples and for the variances to differ.
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of Equation (15). In particular, in column (3) and (4) (IV1) of Table 3, we instrument ν̂i,t with
two instruments:21 the country’s average ratio of personal consumption to gdp, which captures
the behavior of private savings, and the rate of growth of adult population over the first fifteen
years of each sub–sample.22 These two instruments are in the spirit of the model since it treats
savings behavior and population growth as exogenous to the growth process. As can be seen,
the estimates obtained using this set of instruments results in a slightly reduced coefficient on ν̂i
in the first period, but do not change the coefficient in the second period. This leaves unchanged
the observation of a substantial and significant increase in the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i between
the two periods. In columns (5) and (6) of the table, in addition to instrumenting ν̂i as in
the previous experiment, we include the average number of years of education in the country
as an additional regressor.23 The inclusion of this measure of human capital does not affect
the observed pattern regarding the coefficient on ν̂.24 In Columns (7) and (8) of the Table, we
instrument ν̂ using the investment–output ratio in the initial year of each sample period. For
example, we use the investment–output ratio in 1960 to instrument ν̂i over the 1960-78 period.
This instrument has the advantage relative to the average savings rate that it is predetermined
relative to each period under study. We also include the average years of education in the
regression to control for differences across countries in labor augmenting knowledge. Once again
we find a very significant increase in the sensitivity of ŷ to ν̂ between the period 1960–78 versus
1978–98.25
The instruments used in Table 3 can be criticized on the ground that they are unlikely to be
truly exogenous and this lack of exogeneity may explain the results. For example, it may be
that savings behavior has become more correlated with growth outcomes, and it may be that
investment has become better at predicting growth outcome; in which case the instrumental
variable estimates would be biased in favor of observing increased sensitivity of ŷ to ν̂. In
order to address such criticism, in Table 4 we instrument ν̂ using demographic variation across
countries. In Columns (1) and (2) of the table we use the rate of growth of adult population over
the first fifteen years of each sub–sample to instrument ν̂. Since an adult is defined as someone
over 15 years of age, this variable is likely exogenous with respect to growth developments over
the period considered. The most remarkable aspect from this instrumental variable strategy
21The instruments are again expressed as deviations from the US value.
22The reason we take the rate of adult population growth over the first fifteen years as an instrument as opposed
to taking the rate over the entire sub–period is to correct for the potential endogeneity of fertility within each
window, as it takes at least 15 years for fertility to affect the labor force. However, it is worth noting that our
results are almost identical regardless of which if these two measures of adult population growth we use.
23This variable is taken from Barro and Lee [1993].
24We have also verified the robustness of this pattern with respect to several other measures of human capital.
25According to the theory, the regression coefficients in the first period (1960-78) can be used to infer capital
shares (as is done in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)). For example, from the IV regressions in the next to last
column, the implied capital shares is .36, which is quite reasonable. Note however that we cannot directly infer
capital shares from the regression coefficients in the second period.
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Table 4: Robustness to Demographic Instruments
IV3 IV4
60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cst. -0.000 -0.019 0.001 -0.014
( 0.008) ( 0.006) ( 0.007) ( 0.005)
ŷ0 -0.015 -0.019 -0.014 -0.017
( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.004)
ν̂ 0.009 0.050 0.007 0.036
( 0.010) ( 0.014) ( 0.009) ( 0.012)
Ĥ 0.005 -0.004 0.006 0.001
( 0.004) ( 0.007) ( 0.004) ( 0.006)
R2fs 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.43
Fexcl 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.007
Q(Total) 12.954 [0.005] 9.315 [0.025]
Q(y0) 0.695 [0.405] 0.379 [0.538]
Q(ν) 6.595 [0.010] 4.239 [0.040]
Q(H) 1.755 [0.185] 0.514 [0.473]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brack-
ets. IV3: the variable used to instrument bν is the average
growth rate of population over the 15 first years of the
sub–sample. IV4: The instrument is the average annual
rate of growth of total population over the period 1960–
1998. 68 observations. R2fs denotes the R
2 of the first
stage regression. Fexcl denotes the p–value for the F test
for excluded instruments.
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is the similarity in the resulting estimates with respect to those presented in Table 3. Once
again we find that the coefficient on ν̂i increases significantly, with the dependence of initial
condition remaining very stable; thereby supporting the idea of a substantial increase in the
sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i as implied by the model. One potential criticism of using the rate of
growth of adult population over the first fifteen years each sub–sample as an instrument is that
it may be contaminated by measurement error since the regressant is constructed using the
adult population data. To examine relevance of this issue, in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4,
we instrument ν̂i,t using a period invariant demographic instrument which is the average growth
of the entire population over the entire period 1960–1998. In other words, we are now using the
same demographic instrument to instrument ν̂i over the two periods. Hence, unless measurement
errors are increasing substantially over time, which seems unlikely, this instrument should be
immune to the criticism that measurement error would bias in favor of finding an increase in the
sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i. In this case, the coefficient on ν̂i goes from 0.007 to 0.036 and this increase
is again found statistically significant, as the p–value associated to the test for stability of the
coefficient on ν̂ is 0.040. Let us note that all the different instruments we used have substantial
predictive power for ν̂, with R2 of the first stage regression ranging mainly between 0.4 and 0.8,
as reported in the line R2fs of Tables 3 and 4. The IV estimates are also immune against a weak
instruments problem as the p–value of the F test for excluded instruments (Fexcl) indicates that
instruments are jointly significant at standard significance levels (see Staiger and Stock [1997]).
The point we believe that one should take away from these different instrumental variable strate-
gies is that the endogeneity of ν̂ appears to be quite minor, especially over the second period.
Therefore the observed increase in the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i may reasonably be interpreted as
capturing a change in the causal relationship between ν̂i to ŷi. The reason we believe that
this is the most plausible interpretation is that we have not found an endogeneity story which
can simultaneously explain why all these different instrument variables strategies come up with
approximately the same coefficients.
Another potential criticism with the above estimates is that they have been derived without
controlling for many other factors that may affect growth. In order to examine this, we have re–
estimated the above relationships allowing for country fixed effects. These results are presented
in Appendix D.26 Allowing for country fixed effects is an easy way of verifying the robustness of
the above results with respect to omitted (time–invariant) country specific factors such as scale,
institutions or location. As is well known in the literature, when we allow for fixed effects, the
estimated speed of convergence is increased substantial, and this is precisely what we find. More
importantly for the focus of this paper, when we allow for fixed effects, we find a statistically
26When we allow for fixed effects, the instrumental variable strategy exploited under IV4 cannot be implemented
because there is no time variation in the instrument.
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significant and substantial rise in the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i, and this rise corresponds again to
an approximate doubling of the coefficient.
We have also extensively examined adding additional time-varying regressors to our estimations
of Equation (15). For example, we have verified the robustness of our results against includ-
ing different measures of human capital, fertility rates, the relative price of equipment goods
and non–linear terms in initial conditions. In all of these cases, we constantly found that the
coefficient on ν̂ increased significantly between the two periods and by an order of magnitude
similar to that reported here, suggesting that our results are not driven by the omission of widely
recognized co–variates of growth .
Even if the results in Table 3 and 4 are all very similar, thereby providing considerable support
for the idea that the social returns to capital accumulation increased from the 1960–78 period
to the 1978–98 period as implied by the model, it is natural to ask whether these results could
be driven by a few outlier countries. To confront this issue, we looked at whether the results
were sensitive to varying the sample by excluding subgroups of countries. Without reporting
the results here, we examined the robustness of our findings to the following change of sample
(i) excluding the Asia tigers from the sample (i.e., Singapore, Taiwan, Hong–Kong and Korea),
(ii) excluding the countries of South America, (iii) introducing the countries of sub–Saharan
Africa, and (iv) focusing exclusively on the sample of the 18 richest OECD countries. In all
these cases, we found the same pattern whereby there is an approximate doubling or tripling of
the effect of ν̂ on ŷ in the later period relative to the early period.
Since Equation (15) is linear in ν̂i, the above results only provide evidence in favor of the
model’s first order implication regarding the change in mapping between ν̂i and ŷi. However, as
can be seen in Figure 4, the model implies more than just a change in slope, it actually implies
that the process of globalization should change the mapping between ν̂i and ŷi from a linear
mapping to an S-shaped mapping. To explore this possibility, consider the following non–linear
generalization of Equation (15):
ŷi,t+1 − ŷi,t = (λt − 1)ŷit + (1− λt)gt(ν̂i,t) (16)
In order to examine the shape of the the relationship between ν̂i and ŷi, i.e. gt(ν̂i,t), in Figure
5, we plot a non–parametric estimation of the function gt(·) for each subperiod.
27 The impor-
tant aspect to note in Figure 5 is that the estimated change in the g(·) function corresponds
remarkably closely to that implied by the model as highlighted in Figure 4 when x > 0. In
particular, the estimate of g(·) for 1978–98 indicates a strong increase in slope around the point
where ν̂i = 0, while there no such increase in the tails. Recall from Lemma 3 and Proposition
27In Figure 5, we are careful to plot the function gt(·) only over the range where there is positive mass in the
distribution of bνi. For example, about 50% of the mass of bνi lies between -0.5 and 0.3 and the rest of the mass is
in the tails.
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Figure 5: Non–Parametric Estimate of gt(ν̂i,t)
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9 that it is precisely a change of shape of this sort which is necessary for the emergence of
bi–modality. In comparison, for the 1960-78 period, the relationship between ν̂i and ŷi appears
almost perfectly linear. In this sense, Figure 5 provides considerable additional support for the
model prediction.28
4.2 Do the More Open Economies Behave Differently?
Up to now, our empirical approach has been to highlight changes in the growth process that
have arisen during a period where there has been a substantial increase in international trade.
However, in itself, the finding of increased sensitivity of ŷi with respect to ν̂i over time does not
necessarily imply that the change in the growth process is related to emergence of new trading
opportunities. It only supports the theoretical mechanism presented in the model. One way to
address this issue more directly is to look at whether the increased sensitivity of ŷi with respect
to ν̂i is more pronounced among countries most likely affected by the process of globalization.
To this end, we consider two splits of the data. In the first case, we examine what happens
among the initially more open countries versus the less open countries The idea behind this split
is that the initially more open countries are the ones that can take advantage of new trading
opportunities. Second, we examine what happens among countries which experienced the most
increase trade between the two period. This second exercise can be thought as a robustness
check on the first exercise since, if it is the more initially more open countries which take most
advantage of the new trading opportunities, then we should expect the increased sensitivity of
28Since we only have 75 observations in each subperiod, we recognize the need to be somewhat cautious with
results based on non–parametric estimation with such small samples.
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of ŷi with respect to ν̂i to also be most apparent among the set of countries experiencing the
most growth in trade.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we first report estimates of Equation (15) where we include
as additional regressor the initial degree of openness of a country as measured by the ratio of
export–plus–imports to gdp over the 1960-78 period.29 These results are reported in the first
group of columns (openness).30 As can be seen, the inclusion of this openness measure does not
affect our previous findings, as ν̂ is found to approximately double between the period 1960–78
to 1978–98.
Table 5: Openness
OP<med(OP) OP>med(OP) ∆OP<med(∆OP) ∆OP>med(∆OP)
60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Cst. -0.008 -0.017 0.001 -0.015 -0.005 -0.011 -0.001 -0.017 0.003 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
ŷ0 -0.012 -0.014 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.008 -0.015 -0.010 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
ν̂ 0.012 0.028 0.019 0.020 0.006 0.037 0.012 0.023 0.006 0.028
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
OP 0.009 0.007 – – – – – – – –
(0.004) (0.004)
Fexcl 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.000
Q(Total) 7.595 [0.055] 1.285 [0.526] 27.051 [0.000] 1.156 [0.561] 7.214 [0.027]
Q(ŷ0) 0.283 [0.595] 0.996 [0.318] 0.105 [0.746] 0.831 [0.362] 0.029 [0.865]
Q(ν̂) 5.740 [0.017] 0.015 [0.903] 11.287 [0.001] 1.150 [0.284] 4.515 [0.034]
Q(OP) 0.119 [0.730] – – – – – – – –
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. All regressions are estimated by instrumental variables,
where the set of instrument is the average (c/y) over the sub–sample and the average growth rate of population
over the 15 first years of the sub–sample. Fexcl denotes the p–value for the F test for excluded instruments.
We then estimate Equation (15) after dividing our sample into two sub–samples according to
their degree of initial openness (OP). The first sub–sample consists of the set of countries with a
below median value of openness over the first sub–period, while the second sample corresponds
to those with an above median value of openness over the same period. We perform this
dichotomous procedure since it allows a direct reference to the observations presented in Section
1.1; later we will allow the openness variable to interact in a continuous fashion with ν̂i. Recall
29As in Section 1.1, we calculate this measure of openness using the average value of export–plus–imports to gdp
for the period 1960–78. Results are robust to calculating this average over the entire period or each sub-period.
30All the results in this table are derived from instrumental variable estimation using as instruments the set
IV1. The results presented in section are robust to including human capital variables as additional regressors.
Globalization, Returns to Accumulation and the World Distribution of Output 33
that in Section 1.1, we documented that it was only among the more open economies that
an increase in dispersion was observed over the period 1978–98. Given this observation, it
is interesting to ask whether it is also only among this group that we see an increase in the
sensitivity of ŷi with respect to ν̂i. The results from estimating Equation (15) on these two
sub–samples is reported in the second group of columns (Columns (3)–(6)) of Table 5. Clearly,
it is only in the sample of more open economies where we observed a significant increase in the
coefficient ν̂i. In fact, the coefficient of ν̂i is found to be almost perfectly stable for the less
open economies (0.019 for the 1960–78 period, 0.020 for 1978–98) while exhibiting a substantial
increase for the more open economies, as it increase from 0.006 for the period 1960–78 to 0.037
for the period 1978–98. Once again the test for weak instruments clearly indicates that the IV
estimates are immune against any weakness problem.
Figure 6: Rolling regressions
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In order to visualize that change in the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i over time for the whole sample as well
as the two sub–sample of initially more open and more closed economies (OP<median(OP)) and
(OP>median(OP)), we ran a set of 20 rolling regressions over 19-year windows starting with the
period 1960-78. Figure 6 reports the estimated coefficients on ν̂i obtained from rolling regressions
of Equation (15) over the whole sample and these two sub–samples, with each variable measured
in relation to the given window.31 In each case, we plot rolling OLS and IV estimates where the
instrument set is IV1.
What is clear from Figure 6 is that the increase in the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i appears almost
exclusively among the open countries. This is in line with the spirit of our model since it is the
31We estimate a series of regressions with the first regression using observations 1 through 19, the second
regression using observations 2 through 20, etc. . . The abscissae indicates the last year of the sub–sample. We also
explored window sizes between 15 to 25 years, all of which led to similar conclusions. In Beaudry and Collard
[2002] this approach was used to examine changes in the growth process among OECD country’s.
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most open economies that are the ones most likely to take advantage of new trading opportunities
such as those associated with trade in intermediates. In effect, for the countries most open to
international trade, the effects of ν̂i appear to have tripled. One of the attractive features of this
figure is that it clearly illustrates that the phenomenon we have been documenting regarding
the increased sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i is not fragile to our cutting of the sample exactly between
1960–78 versus 1978–98. Instead, what we see is that the coefficient on ν̂i increases continuously
as we include more and more observation in the period 1978–98 versus the period 1960–78.
To further explore the relationship between openness and accumulation, in Columns (7)–(10)
of Table 5, we report estimates of Equation (15) based on an alternative break of the sample.
In particular, we now define two sub–samples according to observed increases in international
trade between the period 1960–78 and 1978–98. The first sample (∆OP<median(∆OP)) is
the set of countries with below median change in international trade, while second sample
(∆OP>median(∆(OP)) is comprised of countries with above median increase. When we split
the sample according to the change in the degree of openness, the results again provide support
to the idea of an interaction between openness and accumulation in the period 1978–98. In fact,
we see that the increased sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i is much more prevalent among the countries with
above median change in international trade than for countries with below median growth. For
the set with ∆OP >median(∆OP) the coefficient on ν̂i increased from 0.006 to 0.028, while for
the set of countries with ∆OP >median(∆) the same coefficient only increased from 0.012 to
0.023 (which is not a statistically significant change). In order to verify once again that these
results are not driven by the omission of important country characteristics, in Appendix D we
report estimates for both sample splits underlying Table 5 allowing for country fixed effects.
In Table 6, we allow ν̂i to interact continuously with the countries’ average degree of openness
(results in Columns (1)–(4) of the table) or with the change in openness between periods 1960–78
versus 1978–98 (results Columns (5)–(8)). The difference between the sets of estimates under the
heading OLS and IV⋆ is that in the first case, the estimates are derived without instrumenting
for ν̂i or the openness variable. In contrast, for the results under the heading IV
⋆, both the
openness variable and ν̂i are instrumented. The set of instruments used to instrument openness
correspond to the instruments used in Hall and Jones [1999].32 The test for excluded instruments
leads to the rejection of weak instrumentation at conventional confidence levels. In all these sets
of estimates, we see that there is a significant positive interaction between openness and ν̂i in
the second period but not in the first, which suggests that over the period 1978–98 the more a
country was open (or the more it experienced growth in trade), the more it experienced a high
32The set of instrument is the average (c/y) over the sub–sample, the average growth rate of population over
the 15 first periods of the sub–sample and the beginning of period investment–to–output ratio. The openness
variable is instrumented by the fraction of the population speaking one of the 5 European languages, the same
fraction for English, the Frankel and Romer geographical based trade instrument and the distance from equator.
Finally, we have interactions between the instruments for accumulation and those for openness.
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Table 6: Openness in Interaction
OLS IV⋆ OLS IV⋆
60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cst. -0.004 -0.013 -0.000 -0.013 -0.004 -0.013 -0.000 -0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
y0 -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
ν 0.020 0.019 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.025 0.016 0.024
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
OP×ν -0.007 0.017 -0.005 0.024 – – – –
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
∆OP×ν – – – – -0.016 0.031 -0.032 0.060
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021)
R2 0.37 0.55 – – 0.38 0.54 – –
Fexcl – – 0.000 0.000 – – 0.000 0.000
Q(Total) 20.982 [0.000] 26.945 [0.000] 20.484 [0.000] 38.023 [0.000]
Q(y0) 0.002 [0.961] 1.517 [0.218] 0.036 [0.849] 3.024 [0.082]
Q(ν) 0.035 [0.852] 0.167 [0.682] 1.626 [0.202] 2.022 [0.155]
Q(x×ν) 7.668 [0.006] 3.940 [0.047] 7.351 [0.007] 13.715 [0.000]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. The set of instrumental variables IV⋆
is discussed in the text. Fexcl denotes the p–value for the F test for excluded instruments.
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return to being a capital intensive country. Moreover, we can see from the estimates in the first
two columns, that for a fictitious, entirely closed economy (i.e., a country with zero imports
plus exports33) the returns to capital are almost unchanged between the two periods, which is
consistent with the idea that it is only if a country was open to international trade that it could
derive greater benefits by accumulating capital since it could thereby attract high wage jobs.34
4.3 What Drives Changes in the Distribution of Output–per–Worker?
The above regression results indicate a significant increase in the sensitivity of ŷi with respect to
ν̂i between the period 1960–78 versus the period 1978–98. However, the fact that the increase
is statistically significant does not imply that it is economically major in the sense of being an
important factor behind the increase dispersion of income across countries over the period 1978
to 1998. A central claim of this paper is not just that the data provide evidence in support of
the mechanism emphasized in the model but that in addition this mechanism is a key element
in the observed changes in the cross–country distribution of income.
In order to explore the extent to which the observed increase sensitivity of ŷi with respect to
ν̂i may be relevant for understanding the observed change in the cross-country distribution of
output–per–worker from 1978 to 1998, in Figure 7, we overlay the actual distribution observed in
1998 and 1978 with a set of counterfactual distributions designed to control for different factors.
The procedure we take for building counterfactuals is common in the literature, especially in
the wage inequality literature (see e.g. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce [1993] among others). To
understand the construction of these counterfactuals, it is necessary to first recognize that ŷ98
can be written as the sum of ŷ78, the estimated growth process between 1978 and 1998, and the
associated residuals:
ŷ98 = ŷ78 + η
78−98
0 + η
78−98
y y
78
i + η
78−98
bνi
ν̂78−98
i
+ ε78−98
i
(17)
where η78−980 , η
78−98
y and η
78−98
bνi
correspond respectively to the constant, the coefficient on ŷ0
and the coefficient on ν̂i derived from the estimation of the growth process between 1978–98,
while ε78−98
i
represents the residuals from the regression. Given this framework, it is possible
to build counterfactuals for ŷ98 by replacing different terms in Equation (17). This hinges on
a preliminary estimation of the growth process. Henceforth, all the counterfactuals are based
on the coefficient derived from estimating Equation (15) by instrumental variables using the
33The openness variable is not expressed as a deviation from the US level as to allow as easier interpretation.
34We also estimated the relations of Table 6 allowing for country fixed effects. These results are available from
the authors upon request. In this case, we found significant and positive increases in the interaction between bνi
and the openness measure (whether it be its level or it difference). Moreover, the magnitude of the change was
very similar to that observed in Table 6. In this sense the results of Table 6 are robust to allowing for country
fixed effects. However, when we allow for fixed effects, for the period 1960–78, we found a significant negative
link between openness and bνi for which we have no clear interpretation.
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set IV1 of instruments. In panel (a) of Figure 7, we build a distribution for ŷ98 by assuming a
Figure 7: Counterfactual Distributions
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counterfactual growth process for the period 1978–98 whereby the coefficient on ν̂ in the growth
process is assumed to take on the value observed over the period 1960–78 instead of its actual
value. In other words, to build the counterfactual that controls for the increase sensitivity of ŷi
with respect to ν̂i, in Equation (17) we replace η
78−98
bνi
by η60−78
bνi
. This can be understood, in
light of the framework developed in Section 1.2, as controlling the distribution of output–per–
worker for a change in gt(·). We can see from the figure, the estimated changes in η
bνi
appears
to account for a substantial amount of the change in the shape of the distribution between 1978
and 1998. In fact, we see that much more mass would be concentrated around the mode of the
distribution if the coefficient on η
bνi
had not increased.
In order to place this result in perspective, it is helpful to compare it with alternative coun-
terfactuals. To this end, we build three other counterfactuals.35 In panel (b) of Figure 7, we
present a counterfactual where we replace ν̂78−98 with ν̂60−78, that is, we build a counterfactual
that controls for changes in the distribution of ν̂ between the two periods. This counterfactual
is particularly relevant for evaluating the importance of alternative models which emphasize
changes in the distribution of ν̂. Controlling for this effect amounts to control for a change
in the function ht(·) described in Section 1.2. In other words, this counterfactual controls for
35Greater details on the construction of the counterfactual distribution can be found in BCG.
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any effect of globalization on the distribution on the long–run propensity to accumulate capital.
Recall that this channel of change is an important component of the model in Ventura [1997].
As can be seen in the figure, the change in the distribution of ν̂ over the two periods cannot
account for much of the change in shape of the distribution between 1978 and 1998 since the
resulting counterfactual distribution for 1998 is almost identical to the actual distribution in
1998.
In the two remaining panels of the figure, we present a counterfactual where, in panel (c),
we replace η78−98y y
78
i
with η60−78y y
60
i
and, in panel (d), we present a counterfactual based on
replacing ε78−98
i
by ε60−78
i
. The first of these two counterfactuals is meant to control for any
change in the dependence of growth on initial conditions, while the second is meant to capture
the potential effects of omitted variables. Again, in both case we see that the counterfactuals
explain little of the change in shape of the distribution between 1978–98.
Instead of a graphical representation of the explanatory power of these counterfactuals, in Table
7 we report a set quantitative measures. In the first column of Table 7, we reports for comparison
the set of changes in percentiles observed over the period 1978–98 discussed in Section 1.1. In
the next three columns we report a set of changes in percentiles that would have been observed
under three counterfactuals. In the first counterfactual (which corresponds to the counterfactual
Table 7: Changes in Percentiles
perc. 98–78 ην ∆µ
ν(·) η0y0
10-90 -0.162 -0.430 0.055 0.052
15-85 0.444 0.093 0.454 0.539
20-80 0.314 0.063 0.219 0.442
25-75 0.376 0.187 0.330 0.398
30-70 0.216 -0.059 0.309 0.308
35-65 0.224 -0.115 0.259 0.286
40-60 0.103 -0.007 0.155 0.090
45-55 0.038 -0.024 0.090 -0.006
given in the first panel of Figure 7), we report the change in percentiles that would have been
observed if the coefficient on ν̂i would have maintained its 1960–78 value of 0.011 over the period
1978–98 instead of having increased to 0.030. As can be seen, many of the entries in the second
column of Table 7 are very close to zero or even negative suggesting that if the sensitivity of ŷi
to ν̂i had not increased we would have seen essentially no changes or even minor decreases in
many percentile differences. The only exceptions are for the interquartile range and the 10–90
percentile difference. For the interquartile range, the counterfactual can explain about half of the
increase observed over the period 1978–98, that is, this counterfactual suggests that the increase
in the interquartile range would have been only of 18.7% instead of the 37.6% observed in the
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data. In the case of the 10–90 difference, the counterfactual actually over–predicts the narrowing
in the distribution relative to what was observed. Hence, we believe that this counterfactual
supports the notion that the rise in the sensitivity of ŷi to ν̂i can explain over 50% of the change
in distribution observed over the period 1978–98.
The third column reports the counterfactual percentile changes for the case where the distribu-
tion of ν̂i in the period 1978–98 is replaced by the distribution observed in the period 1960–78. In
this case we see that the counterfactual percentile changes are of very similar order of magnitude
to that actually observed over the period 1978–98. For example, in the case of the interquartile
range, this counterfactual can only explain about one twelfth of the observed increase, and in
many cases it generates a greater widening under the counterfactual that what was observed.
This confirms the visual impression given in Figure 7 that the change in the distribution of ν̂i
between the two periods is at best a minor element in explaining the observed change in the
distribution.
Finally, in the last column, we report the counterfactual percentile changes associated with
having the dependence of growth on initial condition have the same force over the period 1978–
98 as that observed over the period 1960–78. The interest in this counterfactual lies in offering
an evaluation of the idea that the change in the distribution observed over 1978–98 may be due
to a process whereby the richer were getting richer and the poor getting poorer precisely because
of a change in the dependence on initial conditions. As in the third column, we see that very
little of the observed changes in percentiles appears to be accounted for by such a mechanism.36
In fact, if we focus on the interquartile range, we see that this counterfactual actual implies
an increase larger than what was observed. Overall, these decomposition exercises suggest that
the observed changes in the coefficient on ν̂i is of the right order of magnitude to explain much
of the observed change in the distribution, thereby providing support that the relevance of the
mechanism emphasized in the model. In contrast, these exercises give little support to the idea
that the change in the distribution of ν̂i nor a change in the importance of initial conditions
were central over this period once we control for changes in the importance of ν̂i.
36This result may be criticized on the ground that we only allow initial conditions to enter in a linear fashion.
Therefore, we verified the robustness of this finding against allowing the country’s initial level of output–per–
worker to enter nonlinearly in the growth regressions. Interestingly, when we do not include bνi in the regression,
we find some support for divergence for middle income countries in the second period, that is, growth is found
to be slightly positively related to its initial level for middle income countries over the period 1978–98. However,
once we include bνi, we consistently find that growth is negatively related to initial conditions. This supports the
notion that the data may look at first pass as if increased dispersion is being driven by the rich getting richer and
the poor getting poorer. However, when we control for bνi, we find that divergence appears driven primarily by
an increase in the return to bνi not a change in dependance on initial conditions.
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4.4 Do High ν Countries Concentrate Employment in Capital Intensive Goods?
In this section we examine whether, as implied by the model, countries with high values of νi
experience a greater concentration of employment in high capital intensive jobs during a period
of globalization. In order to make headway on this issue, we gathered data on employment in
manufacturing and non–manufacturing from the laborsta database.37 This data source allows
us to have a consistent series of employment data for this sectorial breakdown for 42 countries
over the period 1978–1998. Regrettably, this data does not go back to 1960 as with our output
data. Nonetheless, they provide sufficient information to examine whether over the period 1978-
98 countries with higher values of νi experience a higher growth in the ratio of manufacturing
employment to total employment relative to countries with low values of νi. Taking for given
that the manufacturing sector tends to be more capital intensive, we examine here whether
employment patterns conform to the predictions of the model. Let us nevertheless stress that
we view this exercise as a very rough way of looking at the implication of the model in term of
employment patterns since we believe that the forces emphasized by the model are at least as
important within industrial sectors as between sectors.
Table 8: Effect on the changes in the labor share in Manufacturing (1978–1998)
OP<med(OP) OP>med(OP)
OLS IV1 IV1 IV1 IV1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cst. 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
man0 -0.040 -0.042 -0.039 -0.028 -0.058
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
ν̂ 0.012 0.016 0.027 0.007 0.035
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.015)
Ĥ – – -0.002 – –
(0.001)
R2 0.70 – – – –
Fexcl – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. 42 observations.
39 observations when education is introduced. The coefficient infront of ν is
multiplied by 100 for easier presentation. Fexcl denotes the p–value for the F
test for excluded instruments.
Column (1) of Table 8 reports results from regressing the change in the ratio of manufacturing
employment to total employment on its initial value, denoted man0 and on ν̂. This regression is
done by OLS, while in the second column we estimate the relationship by instrumental variables
37This database is available from the ilo website: http://www.ilo.org.
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using IV1 as instruments. As can be seen, the effect of ν̂i is found to be positive and quite
significant in both the OLS and IV regressions. In the last two columns of the table, we divide
the sample into the more open and more close economies as we had done previously based on a
countries ratio of imports plus exports to gdp. The interesting finding in Table 8 is that all the
results are consistent with our previous findings in that open countries with high values of ν̂i
appear to have experienced faster growth in the manufacturing employment during the period
1978–98 while simultaneously experiencing high growth in output–per–worker.38 Together we
believe that these observations further support the broad picture of economic change due to
globalization implied by the model.39
5 Concluding Remarks
In many countries, workers and worker movements are observed to have strong reservations
about free trade and globalization due to the risk of losing the best paying jobs to their trading
partners. However, in a world economy, not all countries can lose “good jobs”; some have to
be on the receiving end. In this paper we have presented a model that captures the notion
that the opening up of trade may cause a redistribution of rent paying jobs across countries.
The two most useful features of the model are (i) it highlights who should be the winners
and who are the losers in such a process, and (ii) it indicates how to approach the data to
evaluate such a possibility. In particular, it indicates that the winners should be countries which
most favor capital accumulation, and it indicates how to use cross–country growth regressions
to evaluate this claim. After looking at changes in growth processes, decomposition exercises
and employment patterns, we conclude that the data provide considerable support to the idea
that globalization, through its effect on the redistribution of rent paying jobs, may have been a
central element in the recent reshaping of the cross–country distribution of income.
38In BCG we also document that the countries with high values of bνi experience particularly high growth in
TFP over the period 1978–98.
39Note that the observation that high bν countries experience high growth in manufacturing employment during
a period of globalization does not help differentiate the model regarding whether x is greater or equal to zero
since the model has the same implication on this front regardless of the value of x.
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Appendix
A Allowing for International Capital Flows
In this section, we discuss the implications of relaxing the assumption of no capital mobility in the model.
More precisely, we document the extent to which our main results are robustness to allowing for trade
on financial capital markets.
Let us first consider the case of a perfectly frictionless international financial markets. In this case, the
returns to capital are equalized across countries and the location of capital is independent of the countries
propensity to save. Therefore, in the absence of trade in intermediate goods — and in the absence of
differences in Ωi — the level of output–per–worker is identical across countries. In contrast, when trade
in intermediate goods is allowed, the cross country distribution of output–per–worker is indeterminate
since there are two mechanisms for equalizing the returns to capital across country: through trade or
through international capital flow. Hence, in the extreme case of perfect international capital markets, the
model has no clear predictions on how the opening up of trade will affect the cross-country distribution
of output. This is a rather unsatisfactory result. In order to have a better sense of how our results can
be extended in the presence of international capital flows, it is useful to consider the limiting behavior of
a model with imperfections in international capital market.
To this end, let us consider the case where domestic firms face a risk premium on borrowing in the
international market which is proportional to the country’s debt–to–GDP ratio, and let us examine the
outcome when this risk premium tends to zero. More precisely, let us assume that the cost of capital in
country i, qi, is equal to the cost of capital in the large reference economy (the US) plus a risk premium
which is proportional to the country’s debt to GDP ratio as given by
qi = q0 + ρ
(
ki − ai
yi
)
where ρ is the gradient of the risk premium, ai is the wealth–per–worker in country i and hence (ki− ai)
is the amount of international debt–per–worker in country i. Through the accumulation equation, the
wealth–per–worker along a steady growth path is given by ai = νiyi and therefore the determination of
the domestic cost of capital can alternatively be written as
qi = q0 + ρ
(
ki
yi
− νi
)
Given this equation for the determination of cost of capital, a country level of capital–per–worker and
output–per–worker is determined by equating the international cost of capital to the domestic return on
capital. In the absence of international trade in intermediates, the limiting outcome as ρ goes to zero
will have all countries producing the same amount of output–per–worker since this is the only way the
returns to capital can be equalized across countries. Hence, in this case — and assuming no differences
in Ωi — the cross country distribution of output–per–worker is concentrated at a single point.
If we now open up trade in intermediates, the determination of output–per–worker in country i depends
on νi. In particular, if ν̂ 6 ν̂i 6 ν̂ then the determination of output–per–worker remains the same as in
the absence international capital flows since the returns to capital are equalized (recall that within the
incomplete specialization area, the social returns are constant). As a matter of fact, in the presence of
international capital flows, it is easy to verify that in the limit as ρ goes to zero, the determination of ŷi
is given by
ŷi =

log
(
(1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−α
)
if ν̂ < ν̂
log
(
(β−α)(ϕ(1−α)+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
)
− log
(
1−
(αϕ+β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
exp(ν̂i)
)
if ν̂ 6 ν̂ 6 ν̂
log
(
(1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−β
1+x
)
if ν̂ > ν̂
Appendix 45
As can be seen from the mapping between ŷi and ν̂i, in the limiting case where ρ tends to zero, the
opening up of trade in intermediates causes an increase in dispersion in output–per–worker. This is
because, for countries with ν̂i ∈ [ν̂, ν̂], output–per–worker is no longer equalized but instead becomes an
increasing function of νi. Furthermore, in addition to this increase in dispersion for the countries with
ν̂i ∈ [ν̂, ν̂], the countries with either ν̂i < ν̂ or ν̂i > ν̂ will bunch at two points in the distribution of yi.
Indeed, let us consider the case of a country with a low propensity to capital accumulation (ν̂i < ν̂). In
the limiting case where ρ tends to zero, the only way its return on capital can equalize the world return
on capital is to accumulate up to the point its capital–output ratio reaches ν, such that its ν̂i = ν̂. This
phenomenon likely gives rise to bi-modality. Therefore, the main results presented in the paper survive
the introduction of international capital flows as long as the international capital market is not perfectly
frictionless.40
B Allowing for Endogenous World Prices
In the main body of the paper, we have assumed that under free trade the world price for intermediate
goods correspond to the autarky prices of these goods in the reference economy. Our defense for this
assumption is that the reference economy used in our empirical work is the US economy and since the
US economy is extremely large economically this may constitute a good approximation. However, it is
clearly an approximation. Therefore in this section we discuss how our results must be modified and
rephrased when this assumption is relaxed. It is rather easy to derive the mapping between ν̂i and ŷi
for the case where world prices under free trade do not correspond to the reference economy’s autarky
prices. To do so, let us denote by ν⋆ the value of ν̂ such that a country with ν̂i = ν
⋆ does not trade in
equilibrium since the world prices of intermediates are equal to its autarky prices. Then, the mapping
between ν̂i and ŷi becomes
ŷi =

log
(
(1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−α
)
+ α1−α (ν̂i − ν
⋆ − ν) if (ν̂i − ν
⋆) < ν̂
log
(
(β−α)(ϕ(1−α)+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
)
− log
(
1−
(αϕ+β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
exp(ν̂i − ν
⋆)
)
if ν̂ 6 (ν̂i − ν
⋆) 6 ν̂
log
(
(1−α)ϕ+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−β
1+x
)
+ β1−β (ν̂i − ν
⋆ − ν) if (ν̂i − ν
⋆) > ν̂
The previous equation makes it clear that the presence ν⋆ 6= 0 simply causes a translation of our original
mapping between ν̂i and ŷi. However, the problem with this mapping is that we do not know the value of
ν⋆. Nonetheless, we can still make a conditional statement regarding how the opening of trade will affect
the distribution of ŷi. In particular, in this more general case, Corollary 1 should simply be rephrased as
follows
If the distribution of ν̂i is concentrated around ν
⋆, then the first order effect of free trade on the cross–
country distribution of ŷi is nil when x = 0. In contrast, it leads to an increase in dispersion when
x > 0.
This extended version of Corollary 1 clarifies that our main results hinge on the notion that ν⋆ be not
too different from the mean of ν̂i.
41 In other words, the key condition for our results on the effect of free
trade to hold is that the average capital–output ratio across countries must not be substantially different
the capital–output ratio across the world.42
40In the presence of international capital flows, there are two distinct mechanisms which cause an increase in
the dispersion of yi. There is an increase due to increased dispersion of capital–output ratios and, if x > 0, there
is increased dispersion due to an increase in the return to capital. The model of Ventura [1997] is an alternative
way of emphasizing the first mechanism, while the model presented in the main body of this paper emphasizes
the second mechanism. As the empirical section of the paper has shown, the data are more supportive of the
second mechanism.
41In fact, the result can be strengthened slightly by noting that what is key for our results is that ν⋆ not be
substantially greater than the mean of bνi.
42Based on our calculation using the World Penn tables, this condition appears satisfied.
Appendix 46
C Composition of the sample
Our sample of 75 countries consists of:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Botswana, Canada,
Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, Spain, Finland, Fiji, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, Hon-
duras, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, Mozambique, Malaysia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nether-
lands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Portugal,
Paraguay, Romania, Singapore, El Salvador, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Taiwan, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, South Africa.
D Fixed Effects
Table 9: Fixed Effects
OLS IV1 IV1 IV2 IV3
60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98
ŷ0 -0.059 -0.062 -0.056 -0.059 -0.054 -0.059 -0.053 -0.061 -0.075 -0.084
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
ν̂ 0.021 0.044 0.030 0.053 0.030 0.053 0.019 0.042 0.015 0.063
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Ĥ – – – – 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Fexcl – – 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.002 0.006
Q(ν̂) 38.546 [0.000] 16.828 [0.000] 13.079 [0.000] 10.038 [0.002] 10.154 [0.001]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. The set of instruments corresponds to the IV1, IV2
and IV3 sets discussed in the body text.
Table 10: Fixed Effects and Openness
OP<med(OP) OP>med(OP) ∆OP<med(∆OP) ∆OP>med(∆OP)
60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98 60–78 78–98
ŷ0 -0.053 -0.057 -0.042 -0.045 -0.050 -0.057 -0.052 -0.057
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
ν̂ 0.034 0.045 0.025 0.055 0.044 0.065 0.017 0.044
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007)
Fexcl 0.003 0.000 0.0240 0.157 0.052 0.005 0.000 0.029
Q(ν̂) 2.219 [ 0.136] 14.466 [ 0.000] 6.934 [ 0.008] 13.790 [ 0.000]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. The set of instruments is composed
of the average (c/y) over the sub–sample and the average growth rate of population over the 15
first periods of the sub–sample.
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E Proof of Propositions
In this section we will abstract from any reference to the index of the economy, except when strictly
necessary, in order to save on notation.
Proof of proposition 1: In the absence of trade X1t = X2t = 0 so that the problem the final good
producer has to solve is
max
Z1t,Z2t
Zϕ1tZ
1−ϕ
2t − P1tZ1t − P2tZ2t
This yields the standard input demand functions ϕYt = P1tZ1t and (1− ϕ)Yt = P2tZ2t.
Free entry on the final good market implies that 1 =
P
ϕ
1tP
1−ϕ
2t
Φ with Φ = ϕ
ϕ(1 − ϕ)1−ϕ. Then, defining
the relative price pt = P2t/P1t, we have
P1t = Φp
ϕ−1
t and P2t = Φp
ϕ
t (18)
In the first intermediate good sector, the representative producer solves
max
K1t,K1t
P1tΘ1K
α
1t(ΓtL1t)
1−α −W1tK1t − qtK1t
which leads to the standard input demand functions, αP1tZ1t = qtK1t and (1 − α)P1tZ1t = W1tL1t.
Likewise, in sector 2, we have βP2tZ2t = qtK2t and (1−β)P2tZ2t =W2tL2t. Finally, surplus maximization
by the trade unions subject to labor demands leads to the wage setting ruleW2t =
θ
θ−βW1t = (1+x)W1t.
In equilibrium, we have K1t +K2t = Kt and L1t + L2t = Lt such that solving the system composed of
demand functions for intermediate good, capital and labor in each sector and making use of the wage
setting rule, we easily get
K1t =
αϕ
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
Kt K2t =
β(1− ϕ)
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
Kt
L1t =
ϕ(1− α)
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
Lt L2t =
(1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
Lt
Therefore, we can compute final output as
Yt = Υ(Γt)K
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
t L
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
t (19)
where
Υ(Γt) = Θ
ϕ
1Θ
1−ϕ
2
(αϕ)αϕ(β(1− ϕ))β(1−ϕ)
[αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)]αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
((1− α)ϕ)(1−α)ϕ
(
(1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
)(1−β)(1−ϕ)
[
(1− α)ϕ+ (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
]ϕ(1−α)+(1−ϕ)(1−β)Γ1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)t
such that output–per–worker yt = Yt/Lt expresses, in terms of capital–per–worker kt = Kt/Lt, as
yt = Υ(Γt)k
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
t (20)
Hence the dynamics of the economy — in intensive form — may be summarized by
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
kt+1
Γt+1
= sΥ
(
kt
Γt
)αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
+ (1− δ)
(
kt
Γt
)
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where Υ = Υ(Γt)/Γ
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
t which admits
k⋆ =
(
sΥ
(1 + γ)(1 + n) + δ − 1
) 1
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
= (νΥ)
1
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
as steady state.
q.e.d 2
Proof of proposition 2: In the autarkic economy, private (rat ) and social (z
a
t ) returns to capital
are the same. Indeed, the rental rate of capital, in terms of good 1, is given by
qt = αP1t
Z1t
K1t
= βP2t
Z2t
K2t
In equilibrium, we have P1tZ1t = ϕYt and P2tZ2t = (1− ϕ)Yt, therefore
qt = αϕ
Yt
K1t
= β(1− ϕ)
Yt
K2t
= (αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))
Yt
Kt
Hence, the returns to capital, in terms of the final good, are given by
rat = z
a
t = qt = (αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))
Yt
Kt
= (αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))Υ(Γt)kt
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)−1
q.e.d 2
Proof of Proposition 3: In the closed economy, the aggregate production function in economy i
along a steady growth path is given by
yi = Υ(Γ)
1
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ) ν
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
i
where ν ≡ s/((1+ γ)(1+n)− (1− δ)). Let us consider the (log–)difference between output per worker in
economy i and in the big economy, ŷ = log(yi)− log(y0), where 0 denotes the big economy. Let us define
ν̂i = log(νi)− log(ν0), we then have
ŷi = g(ν̂i) =
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
ν̂i
Making use of the change of variable formula, and denoting by µbν(·) the distribution of ν̂, we have
µby(ŷ) =
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
µν
(
1− αϕ− β(1− ϕ)
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
ŷ
)
q.e.d 2
Proof of lemma 1: In the small open economy, each firm producing the final good takes the price
of goods as given, such that final output is given by
Yt = P1tZ1t + P2tZ2t
The intermediate goods producers problem may be rewritten as
max
K1t,K2t,L1t,L2t,Z1t,Z2t
P1tZ1t + P2tZ2t − qtKt −W1tL1t −W2tL2t
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subject to 
Z1t 6 Θ1K
α
1t(ΓtL1t)
1−α
Z2t 6 Θ2K
β
2t(ΓtL2t)
1−β
K1t +K2t 6 Kt
L1t + L2t 6 Lt
L1t > 0, L2t > 0, K1t > 0, K2t > 0
W2t = (1 + x)W1t
Since technology is strictly increasing in inputs, the first four constraints ought to bind, such that the
problem simplifies to
max
K1t,Kt,L1t,Lt
P1tΘ1K
α
1t(ΓtL1t)
1−α+P2tΘ2(Kt−K1t)
β(Γt(Lt−L1t))
1−β−qtKt−W1tL1t−(1+x)W1t(Lt−L1t)
subject to L1t > 0, Lt > L1t, K1t > 0, Kt > K1t to which we associate the lagrange multipliers
λ0L, λ
1
L, λ
0
K , λ
1
K . This leads to the following set of optimality conditions
βP2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt = qt (21)
(1− β)P2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β
Γ1−βt = (1 + x)W1t (22)
αP1tΘ1
(
K1t
L1t
)α−1
Γ1−αt − βP2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt = λ
1
Kt − λ
0
Kt (23)
(1− α)P1tΘ1
(
K1t
L1t
)α
Γ1−αt − (1− β)P2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β
Γ1−βt − xW1t = λ
1
Lt − λ
0
Lt (24)
An interior solution, for which K1t,K2t, L1t, L2t > 0 — which corresponds to a specialization phase —
implies that K1t, K2t, L1t and L2t satisfy (using (22)–(24))
K2t
L2t
=
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
=
β(1− α)(1 + x)
α(1− β)
K1t
L1t
(25)
Let us first study the conditions under which an economy chooses to specialize in the production of type 1
intermediate good. In this case, K1t = Kt and L1t = Lt, which implies that λ
0
Kt = λ
0
Lt = 0 and λ
1
Kt > 0
and λ1Lt > 0. Therefore, equations (22)–(24), evaluated along (25), satisfy
αP1tΘ1
(
K1t
L1t
)α−1
Γ1−αt − βP2tΘ2
(
β(1− α)(1 + x)
α(1− β)
K1t
L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt > 0
(1− α)P1tΘ1
(
K1t
L1t
)α
Γ1−αt −
1− β
1 + x
P2tΘ2
(
β(1 + x)(1− α)
α(1− β)
K1t
L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt > 0
which triggers that
K1t
L1t
=
Kt
Lt
6 k(pt,Γt) ≡ Γt
(
pt
Θ2
Θ1
) 1
α−β
(
β
α
) β
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
) 1−β
α−β
where pt = P2t/P1t.
Let us now study the conditions under which an economy chooses to specialize in the production of type 2
intermediate good. In this case, K2t = Kt and L2t = Lt, which implies that λ
1
Kt = λ
1
Lt = 0 and λ
0
Kt > 0
and λ0Lt > 0. Therefore, equations (22)–(24), evaluated along (25), satisfy
αP1tΘ1
(
α(1− β)
β(1− α)(1 + x)
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)α−1
Γ1−αt − βP2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt 6 0
(1− α)P1tΘ1
(
α(1− β)
β(1− α)(1 + x)
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)α
Γ1−αt −
1− β
1 + x
P2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt 6 0
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which triggers that
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
=
Kt
Lt
> k(pt,Γt) ≡ Γt
(
pt
Θ2
Θ1
) 1
α−β
(
β
α
) α
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
) 1−α
α−β
q.e.d 2
Proof of proposition 4: We have to study three cases, depending on the level of the capital per
efficient unit of labor.
• kt 6 k(pt,Γt): In this case, the economy fully specializes in the production of type 1 intermediate
good, we therefore have yt = P1tz1t = P1tΘ1k
α
t Γ
1−α
t , where yt = Yt/Lt and z1t = Z1t/Lt. Since
P1t is given by (18), we finally have yt = Φp
ϕ−1
t Θ1k
α
t Γ
1−α
t .
• kt > k(pt,Γt): In this case, the economy fully specializes in the production of type 2 intermediate
good, we therefore have yt = P2tz2t = P2tΘ2k
β
t Γ
1−β
t , where z2t = Z2t/Lt. Since P2t is given by
(18), we finally have yt = Φp
ϕ
t Θ2k
β
t Γ
1−β
t .
• k(pt,Γt) 6 k 6 k(pt,Γt): In this case, the economy lies in the specialization process, and we have
yt = P1tz1t + P2tz2t
We therefore have to solve the allocation of capital and labor problem. This implies solving the
set of equations
αP1tΘ1
(
K1t
L1t
)α−1
Γ1−αt = βP2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt (26)
(1− α)P1tΘ1
(
K1t
L1t
)α
Γ1−αt =
1− β
1 + x
P2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β
Γ1−βt (27)
which implies that
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
=
β(1− α)(1 + x)
α(1− β)
K1t
L1t
(28)
K1t
L1t
= Γt
(
pt
Θ2
Θ1
) 1
α−β
(
β
α
) β
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
) 1−β
α−β
= k(pt,Γt) (29)
Let us then denote σLt = L1t/Lt and σKt = K1t/Kt. Solving (28) and (29), we get
σLt =
β(1− α)
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
−
α 1−β1+x
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
kt
k(pt,Γt)
(30)
σKt = σLt
k(pt,Γt)
kt
(31)
We therefore easily get
P1tz1t = P1tΘ1k(pt)
αΓ1−αt σLt
=
β(1− α)
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
P1tΘ1k(pt,Γt)
αΓ1−αt −
α 1−β1+x
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
P1tΘ1Γ
1−α
t k(pt,Γt)
α−1kt
Likewise, straightforward calculation gives
1− σLt =
α 1−β1+x
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
(
kt
k(pt,Γt)
− 1
)
(32)
1− σKt =
β(1− α)(1 + x)
α(1− β)
k(pt,Γt)
kt
(1− σLt) (33)
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We therefore easily get
P2tz2t = P2tΘ2
(
β(1− α)(1 + x)
α(1− β)
k(pt,Γt)
)β
Γ1−βt (1− σLt)
= P2tΘ2
(
β(1− α)(1 + x)
α(1− β)
k(pt,Γt)
)β
Γ1−βt
α 1−β1+x
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
(
kt
k(pt,Γt)
− 1
)
Then, after simple although tedious algebra and making use of (18), we get
yt = B(pt)Γt +A(pt)kt (34)
where
B(pt) = Φp
ϕ−1
t
(β−α)(1−α)
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
(ptΘ2)
α
α−βΘ
β
β−α
1
(
β
α
) αβ
α−β
(
1−β
(1−α)(1+x)
)α(1−β)
α−β
A(pt) = Φp
ϕ−1
t
α(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
(ptΘ2)
1−α
β−αΘ
1−β
α−β
1
(
β
α
) β(1−α)
β−α
(
1−β
(1−α)(1+x)
) (1−β)(1−α)
β−α
q.e.d 2
Proof of proposition 5: Under free trade, the private returns to capital, (rftt ), are given by (see
proof of lemma 1, equation (21))
rftt = qt = βP2tΘ2
(
Kt −K1t
Lt − L1t
)β−1
Γ1−βt
which rewrites
rftt = βP2tΘ2k
β−1
t
(
1− σKt
1− σLt
)β−1
Γ1−βt = βP2tΘ2
(
β(1− α)(1 + x)
α(1− β)
k(pt,Γt)
)β−1
Γ1−βt
Plugging the definition of k(pt,Γt) and that of P2t in the latter equation, we get
rftt = βΦp
ϕ−1
t (ptΘ2)
1−α
β−αΘ
1−β
α−β
1
(
β
α
)−α(1−β)
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
)− (1−α)(1−β)
α−β
Further from the optimal allocation of Z1 and Z2 in the big economy (autarkic world), we have
pt =
1− ϕ
ϕ
Z1t
Z2t
Using the value of z1t and z2t, the relative price, pt, evaluated at the steady growth path of the big
economy (indexed by 0) is given by
p⋆ =
Θ1
Θ2
αα(θ(1− α))1−α
ββ
(
1−β
1+x
)1−β
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
(1− α)ϕ+ (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
)β−α(
k0t
Γt
)α−β
(35)
Plugging this expression in the definition of k(p,Γ), we can express the private return to capital (at the
steady state of the big economy) as
rftt = Θ
ϕ
1Θ
1−ϕ
2
(αϕ)αϕ(ϕ(1− α))ϕ(1−α)(β(1− ϕ))β(1−ϕ)
(
(1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
)(1−β)(1−ϕ)
(αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
(
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
)1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ) . . .
×(αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))k0t
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)−1Γ
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
t
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or
rftt = (αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))Υ(Γt)k0t
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)−1 = rat
We now consider the social return to capital, which is now obtained by deriving the aggregate production
function when the economy produces both goods. Hence, we have zftt = A(pt). Using the definition of
A (see proposition 4) and the expression for p⋆, the social return to capital in the steady state of the big
economy is given by
zftt =
1− α− 1−β1+x
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
(αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))B(Γt)k
⋆
t
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)−1 =
1− α− 1−β1+x
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
za
It is then straightforward to verify that as long as α, β ∈ (0, 1) and x > 0 the multiplier term is greater
than 1, such that zft > za.
q.e.d 2
Proof of Proposition 6: Given the form of the production function reported in Figure 3, the model
admits 1, 3 or an infinity of non–trivial steady state (the trivial steady state being 0).
• Let us first consider the case where we have an infinity of steady state. This occurs when the ray
k/ν overlies the linear part of the production function, which can only happen if and only if that
the linear part reduced to A(p)k. This situation would then corresponds to B(p) = 0, which is
impossible if β > α.
• A second possibility of multiple equilibria is to have 3 steady states. But the form of the function
triggers that a first steady state lies in the area where the economy is fully specialized in the
production of type 1 intermediate goods, one in the zone of full specialization in type 2 intermediate
goods, and one in the specialization area. This can only be the case if the linear part of the
production function crosses the ray k/ν from below, which implies a negative value for B(p) which
is impossible.
Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium.
q.e.d 2
Proof of lemma 2: We first start by characterizing the two boundary values ν̂ and ν̂.
• Let us compute ν(pt,Γt) = k(pt,Γt)/y(pt,Γt). At this particular value, we have yit = P1tz1it, such
that
ν(pt,Γt) =
p1−ϕt
Φ
k(pt,Γt)
1−α
Θ1Γ
1−α
t
Plugging into the previous equation the definition of k(pt,Γt) and the definition of pt along the
steady growth path of the big economy (Equation (35)), we have
ν(pt,Γt) =
α
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
k0t
Υ(Γt)k0t
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
=
α
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
k0t
y0t
=
α
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
ν0
Hence, we have ν̂ ≡ log(ν(pt, γt))− log(ν0) = log
(
α
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
)
• Let us now compute ν(pt,Γt) = k(pt,Γt)/y(pt,Γt). At this particular value, we have yit = P2tz2it,
such that
ν(pt,Γt) =
p−ϕt
Φ
k(pt,Γt)
1−β
Θ2Γ
1−β
t
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Plugging into the previous equation the definition of k(pt,Γt) and the definition of p at the steady
state of the big economy, we have
ν(pt,Γt) =
β
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
k0,t
Υ(Γt)k0,t
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
=
β
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
k0,t
y0,t
=
β
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
ν0
Hence, we have ν̂ ≡ log(ν(pt,Γt))− log(ν0) = log
(
β
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
)
We then have to consider 3 cases:
νi < ν: In this case y = P1tΘ1k
αΓ1−αt . Evaluating this along a steady growth path, we have yit =
(Φpϕ−1t Θ1)
1
1−α ν
α
1−α
i Γt. Plugging the expression of the relative price along the steady growth path
of the big economy (Equation (35)) in the output–per–worker in economy i, and remembering (i)
the definition of Υ(Γt), (ii) the definition of output–per–worker in the big economy, we have
yit =
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
α
) α
1−α (1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
1− α
(
νi
ν0
) α
1−α
y0t
taking log on both sides, we have
ŷit =
α
1− α
log
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
α
)
+ log
(
(1− α)ϕθ + (1− β)(1− ϕ)(θ − β)
θ(1− α)
)
+
α
1− α
ν̂i
ν 6 νi 6 ν: In this case yit = A(pt)kit+B(pt)Γt. Evaluating this along a steady growth path, where kit = νiyit,
we have yt =
B(pt)Γt
1−A(pt)νi
. Around the steady growth path of the big economy, we have
A(pt) =
(αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))
(
1− α− 1−β1+x
)
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
y0t
k0t
and B(pt)Γt =
(β − α)
(
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
)
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
y0t
Remembering that ν0 =
k0t
y0t
, we then get yit =
ρy0t
1−(1−ρ) ν
ν0
where ρ =
(β−α)(ϕ(1−α)+(1−ϕ) 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
such
that ŷ = log(ρ)− log (1− (1− ρ) exp(ν̂i)).
νi > ν: In this case yt = P2tΘ2k
β
t Γ
1−β
t . Evaluating this along a steady growth path, we have yit =
(Φpϕt Θ2)
1
1−β ν
β
1−β
i Γt. Then, using previous results for νi < ν, we then have, around the steady
growth path of the big economy,
yit =
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
β
) β
1−β ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−β
1+x
(
νi
ν0
) β
1−β
y0t
taking log on both sides, we have
ŷi =
β
1− β
log
(
αϕ+ β(1− ϕ)
β
)
+ log
(
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−β
1+x
)
+
β
1− β
ν̂i
q.e.d 2
Proof of proposition 7: We start by computing the threshold values, y(p) and y(p), for the dis-
tribution. These values are simply obtained by plugging the values for k(p) and k(p) in the relevant
production functions. We therefore have
y(pt,Γt) = P1tΘ1k(pt,Γt)
αΓ1−αt and y(pt,Γt) = P2tΘ2k(pt,Γt)
βΓ1−βt
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using the definition of k(pt,Γt), k(pt,Γt), P1t and P2t, we get
y(pt,Γt) = ΦΓtp
ϕ−1+ α
α−β
t Θ
β
β−α
1 Θ
α
α−β
2
(
β
α
) αβ
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
)α(1−β)
α−β
and
y(pt,Γt) = ΦΓtp
ϕ−1+ β
α−β
t Θ
β
β−α
1 Θ
α
α−β
2
(
β
α
) αβ
α−β
(
1− β
(1− α)(1 + x)
) β(1−α)
α−β
We now determine the shape of the distribution along a steady growth path, that is when kit = νiyit. In
this case, the relative price is given by expression (35). Hence,denoting by y0t the output level along a
steady growth path in the big economy, we can reexpress the thresholds as
y(pt,Γt) =
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
1− α
y0,t and y(pt,Γt) =
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−β
1+x
y0,t
We now study the distribution of ŷ = log(yt)− log(y0,t). The direct application of the change of variable
formula on the relationship reported in lemma 2 yields
µby(ŷ) =

1−α
α
µ
bν
(
1−α
α
(ŷ − ŷ)− log
(
α
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
))
if ŷ < ŷ
(1− ρ) exp(ŷ)
1− (1− ρ) exp(ŷ)
µ
bν
(
log
(
1− (1− ρ) exp(ŷ)
ρ
))
if ŷ 6 ŷ 6 ŷ
1−β
β
µ
bν
(
1−β
β
(ŷ − ŷ)− log
(
β
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
))
if ŷ > ŷ
where µ
bν(·) is the distribution of ν̂ = log(ν)− log(ν0), ρ ≡
(αϕ+β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
,
ŷ ≡ log
(
y(p)
y0
)
= log
(
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
1− α
)
and ŷ ≡ log
(
y(p)
yb
)
= log
(
ϕ(1− α) + (1− ϕ) 1−β1+x
1−β
1+x
)
q.e.d 2
Proof of proposition 8 Let us first consider the autarkic case. In this situation, the aggregate
production function in economy i in the steady state is given by yit = Υ(Γt)
1
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ) ν
αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ)
i .
Let us consider the (log–)difference between output per worker in economy i and in the big economy,
ŷi = log(y)i − log(y0). Let us define ν̂i = log(νi) − log(ν0), we then have ŷi =
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
1−αϕ−β(1−ϕ) ν̂i, which is
independent from the distortion induced by the existence of trade union.
Let us now consider the case of an open economy, and use the relationship established in lemma 2. We
compute the sensitivity of the dispersion in the level of output to the dispersion in the long run propensity
to accumulate capital. Three cases should be considered
ν̂i < ν̂: The sensitivity is given by
∂byi
∂bνi
= α1−α is unaffected by the trade union markup.
ν̂i > ν̂: The sensitivity is given by
∂byi
∂bνi
= β1−β is unaffected by the trade union markup.
ν̂ < ν̂i < ν̂: The sensitivity is given by
∂byi
∂bνi
= ρ exp(bνi)1−ρ exp(bνi) where ρ ≡
(αϕ+β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
. Note that ∂
2
by
∂bν∂ρ
=
exp(bν)
(1−ρ exp(bν))2 > 0 such that the sensitivity of ŷ to ν̂ is an increasing function of ρ. Then, note that
∂ρ
∂x
=
(1− α)(1− β)(αϕ+ β(1− ϕ))
(β − α)(1 + x)2
(
β(1− α)− α 1−β1+x
)2 > 0
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Hence, in an open economy, the larger the trade union distorsion, the greater the sensitivity of ŷi
to ν̂i.
q.e.d 2
Proof of Corollary 1: Let us recall that within a close economy, the dispersion of log output per
worker is determined by ŷi =
αϕ+β(1−ϕ)
1−αϕ+β(1−ϕ) ν̂i while, when we open trade, it changes to ŷ = log(ρ) −
log (1− (1− ρ) exp(ν̂i)) which can be approximated, around the steady state of the big economy as
ŷi ≃
ρ
1−ρ ν̂i where ρ ≡
(αϕ+β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
. Note that absent of trade union (x=0), ρ = αϕ+β(1−ϕ),
such that we regain the dispersion in the close economy. Conversely, we saw in the proof of Proposition
8 that ∂ρ/∂x > 0, such that ∂by
∂bν
∣∣
x>0
> ∂by
∂bν
∣∣
x=0
q.e.d 2
Proof of lemma 3: Since Y1 is unimodal and is a linear transformation of ν, it has to be the case
that ν is also unimodal. From the change of variable formula, we know that the distribution of ν is given
by µy2(y2) =
µν(g
−1(y2))
|g′(g−1(y2))|
. Since g′(·) > 0, this reduces to µy2(y2) =
µν(g
−1(y2))
g′(g−1(y2))
. A necessary condition
for the existence of a least two modes in µy2 is that there exists y20, such that µy2 is decreasing at the
left of y20 and increasing above it. Therefore, it has to be the case that for any δ > 0, ε > 0, with δ < ε,
g′(g−1(y20− δ)) 6 g
′(g−1(y20)) and g
′(g−1(y20+ δ)) 6 g
′(g−1(y20− δ)). Hence, it has to be the case that
g′(g−1(y20))−g
′(g−1(y20−δ))
δ
> 0 and g
′(g−1(y20+δ))−g
′(g−1(y20−δ))
δ
6 0. q.e.d 2
Proof of Proposition 9: Lemma 2 established the functional g(·) that relates ν̂i to ŷi. Differen-
tiating g(·), we get
g′(ν̂i) =

α
1−α if ν̂i < ν̂
ρ exp(bνi)
1−ρ exp(bνi)
if ν̂ 6 ν̂i 6 ν̂
β
1−β if ν̂i > ν̂
with ρ ≡
(αϕ+β(1−ϕ))(1−α− 1−β1+x )
β(1−α)−α 1−β1+x
. First, note that, whatever x > 0, for ν̂ 6 ν̂ 6 ν̂, we have g′′(ν̂) =
ρ exp(bν)
(1−ρ exp(bν))2 > 0
• When x = 0, ρ = αϕ+ β(1 − ϕ), implying that g′(ν̂) = α/(1− α) and g′(ν̂) = β/(1 − β). Hence,
g′′(·) > 0 over the whole support of ν̂. From lemma 3, we now that this rules out bi–modality.
• When x > 0, we have g′(ν̂) = α1−α
1−α− 1−β1+x
β−α and g
′(ν̂) = β1−β
1−α− 1−β1+x
β−α
1+x
. But, since β ∈ (0, 1),
1−α− 1−β1+x
β−α > 1, such that g
′(·) is increasing for ν ∈ (−∞, ν̂). Conversely, as soon as x > 0,
1−α− 1−β1+x
β−α
1+x
< 1, which implies that lim
bν↑bν g
′(ν̂) > lim
bν↓bν g
′(ν̂) Therefore, g′(·) is decreasing over
some range of values for ν, which creates the possibility of bi–modality.
q.e.d 2
